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[31] 
The Taxation of Thieves and Their Victims: 





It took decades, but the Supreme Court ultimately decided that profits 
from illegal activities are included in the income of the wrongdoer.  
Unfortunately, the inclusion of illegal income was the only issue that was 
clearly settled.  This Article discusses the federal tax laws as they apply to 
criminals and their victims, including many nontax legal and social issues. 
Part II describes the history and evolution of the case law that resulted 
in the inclusion in income of profits from all types of illegal activities, 
including embezzlement and extortion.  Initially, a determination must be 
made as to whether an activity or transaction constitutes theft for tax 
purposes.  Are misappropriations with the immediate intent to repay a theft 
or transactions couched as loans or investment opportunities in reality 
fraudulent?  With the inclusion of illegal income, criminals are required to 
file a tax return and report all illegal income on the return despite the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Questions also arise as to 
whether the tax laws should be used to punish criminals for other crimes 
and whether tax evaders can receive a fair trial with evidence of other 
crimes admitted at trial.  Important to victims of theft is the section of the 
article exploring the priority of federal tax liens over the victim’s claim for 
restitution from any money or property held by the wrongdoer.  Next, Part 
II examines the various methods used by the Internal Revenue Service to 
detect unreported income.  Special attention is given to penalties imposed 
on the nonfiling of tax returns or the nonreporting of income by criminals, 
ranging from negligence to fraud, both civil and criminal, and the 
possibility of prison sentences.  Finally, as illegal activities are often 
businesses or activities engaged in for profit, the availability of deductions 
for expenses and losses incurred is an important consideration for 
criminals. 
Part III explores the tax consequences to the victims of illegal 
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activities.  A detailed discussion follows as to the allowability and 
characterization of theft losses, whether of money or property, and the 
recognition and characterization of gains from the theft of property.  A 
discussion of the amount and timing of theft losses allowed by I.R.C. 
section 165 and of bad debt deductions allowed by I.R.C. section 166 is 
also provided.  Typically, a theft results in a loss deduction but, 
counterintuitively, a theft of property may result in a gain.  The ability to 
defer gain realized pursuant to I.R.C. section 1033 is explored.  The article 
examines the Tax Benefit Rule as it applies to the receipt of previously 
deducted theft losses and possible application of the net operating loss 
provisions.  The tax treatment of theft loss and gain in the computation of 
taxable income of an individual is then discussed, focusing on the tax 
treatment of itemized deductions.  The article ends with a detailed 
examination of tax treatment of losses from fraudulent investment schemes.  
Generally, taxpayers prefer a loss characterized as an ordinary theft loss as 
opposed to a restricted capital investment loss.  In 2009, the Internal 
Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 2009-9 and Revenue Procedure 
2009-20 that provide the tax treatment and guidelines for claiming theft 
losses from Ponzi schemes.  A more difficult analysis is the tax treatment 
of losses produced by other types of fraudulent investment schemes. 
 
II. TAXATION OF THIEVES 
 
A. INCLUSION OF UNLAWFUL INCOME 
 
The final determination that income from all types of criminal activity 
is included in gross income for federal tax purposes was reached “after a 
series of confusing and conflicting Supreme Court decisions.”1  The 
Revenue Act of 1913, enacted shortly after the passage of the Sixteenth 
Amendment,2 taxed income from multiple sources, including “the 
transaction of any lawful business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or 
profits and income derived from any source whatever.”3  Without 
comment, Congress eliminated the word “lawful” from the statute three 
years later.4 
During Prohibition,5 the Treasury Department relied on this 
 
 1. 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GIFTS, ¶ 6.4, at 6–27 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 3d ed. 1999). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (giving Congress the power to “lay and collect taxes on incomes, 
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to 
any census or enumeration”). 
 3. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(b), 38 Stat. 114, 167. 
 4. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757. 
 5. National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1921), repealed by Cullen-
Harrison Act, ch. 4, 48 Stat. 16 (1933). 
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unexplained change in the definition of “gross income” to prosecute 
bootleggers who failed to report income from their illegal traffic in liquor, 
arguing that the change manifested a legislative intent to tax the profits of 
unlawful as well as lawful activities.6  However, the Supreme Court 
struggled for decades with the question of whether income from illegal 
activity is included in income for the purposes of federal income taxation.7 
In Sullivan v. United States,8 the taxpayer was a bootlegger who 
generated profit from the illegal sale of liquor.9  In defense of not filing a 
tax return, the taxpayer contended: (1) unlawful gains are not within the 
meaning of income under the Internal Revenue Code;10 and (2) in any 
event, the duty of filing a tax return violated the Fifth Amendment, 
providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against oneself.11  The Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress did 
not intend to allow an individual unlawfully employed to avoid taxation 
and thereby increase the burdens of individuals lawfully employed.12  
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that to require a tax return “from one 
whose income is derived from a violation of criminal law is in conflict with 
the Fifth Amendment.”13 
The Supreme Court, in Sullivan,14 agreed with the Fourth Circuit that 
the taxpayer’s illegal income was subject to tax.15  With regard to the 
Fourth Circuit’s finding that the requirement of a tax return violated the 
privilege against self-incrimination granted by the Fifth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court stated: “It would be an extreme if not an extravagant 
application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to 
refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in 
crime.”16  The Supreme Court concluded that the taxpayer must raise the 




 6. BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, ¶ 4.06, at 4-41 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 3d ed. 2002). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Sullivan v. United States, 15 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1926) [hereinafter Sullivan I]. 
 9. Id. at 810. 
 10. All references to the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) are to the 1986 Internal Revenue 
Code, codified under Title 26 of the United States Code, as amended, or Treasury Regulations 
promulgated thereunder. 
 11. Sullivan I, 15 F.2d at 810.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) [hereinafter Sullivan II]. 
 15.  Id. Justice Holmes stated, “We see no reason to doubt the interpretation of the Act, or any 
reason why the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying taxes that if lawful it 
would have to pay.” Id.  
 16. Id. at 263–64. 
 17. Id. at 263. 
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1. Embezzlement and Extortion  
 
In Sullivan, the income was obtained through unlawful conduct but 
not the type of unlawful conduct, such as embezzlement or extortion, 
resulting in a legal obligation under state law to make restitution.  Almost 
twenty years later, in Commissioner v. Wilcox,18 the Supreme Court held 
that embezzled funds are not included in gross income because, as in the 
case of a loan, the funds are received subject to an obligation of 
repayment.19 
In Wilcox, the taxpayer was a bookkeeper who embezzled from his 
employer, losing most of the embezzled funds in gambling houses.20  The 
Supreme Court noted that the inclusion of income is conditioned upon: (1) 
the presence of a claim of right; and (2) the absence of a definite, 
unconditional obligation to repay or return.21  Accepting the loan analogy, 
the Supreme Court determined that embezzled funds do not constitute 
income because the taxpayer did not have a bona fide claim to the funds 
and had an unqualified obligation to repay the funds.22  Even though the 
embezzler dissipated the funds, the Supreme Court asserted that recovery 
by the victim would be jeopardized if the embezzler were required to pay 
part of the embezzled funds to satisfy a tax liability.23  To permit a tax 
would serve only to give the United States an unjustified preference to 
money that rightfully belongs to the taxpayer’s employer.24 
Six years later, in Rutkin v. United States,25 the Supreme Court 
addressed whether money obtained by extortion is income.26  The taxpayer 
extorted $250,000 from his former partner in a bootlegging business by 
threats to kill him and his family.27  Although extortion resembles 
embezzlement in imposing an obligation to reimburse the victim, the 
Supreme Court held that the extorted funds were included in the 
extortionist’s income.28  Again applying a claim of right rational, the 
 
 18. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946). 
 19. Id. at 408–409.  
 20. Id. at 406.  
 21. Id. at 408 (citing N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnett, 286 U.S. 417 (1932)). See N. Am. Oil, 286 
U.S. at 424 (defining the Claim of Right Doctrine as follows: “If a taxpayer receives earnings under a 
claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required 
to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though 
he may be still be adjudge liable to restore its equivalent.”). 
 22. Wilcox, 327 U.S. at 408.  
 23. Id. at 414.  
 24. Id. at 411.  
 25. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952). 
 26. Id. at 131. 
 27. Id. at 134. 
 28. Id. at 138–39.  But see id. at 139–40 (Black, J. dissenting) (arguing that like an embezzler, an 
extortionist has no legal or equitable claim to the money and is under a continuing obligation to return 
the money, therefore, has not received taxable income any more than if the extortionist borrowed the 
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Supreme Court noted that a taxpayer derives economic value from 
unlawful gain, as well as lawful gain, and, if the taxpayer has control over 
the funds, the taxpayer has the freedom to dispose of the funds at will.29  
Practically, a victim of extortion is more likely to be silent because of the 
fear of exposure or violence, making it less likely that the extortionist will 
be asked to make restitution.30 
The distinction between embezzled funds and extorted funds for tax 
purposes lasted for nine years.  Finally, in James v. United States,31 the 
Supreme Court held that embezzled funds constituted income.32  The 
taxpayer, a union official, embezzled more than $700,000 from his union 
and an insurance company doing business with his union.33  The Supreme 
Court overruled its decision in Wilcox and held that income from illegal 
activity is taxable despite the legal obligation of the wrongdoer to make 
restitution.34  The embezzler does not intend to honor the obligation to 
make restitution and, as a practical matter, has sufficient control over the 
funds to derive an economic benefit.35  If restitution is made to the victim, 
the embezzler may deduct the amount repaid in the tax year in which 
repayment is made.36 
 
2. Questionable Circumstances 
 
With the James decision, gross income includes all illegal receipts, 
even if the type of crime subjects the wrongdoer to an obligation to repay 
or if the wrongdoer promises restitution.37  Even a prompt promise to repay 
does not convert a taxable theft into a nontaxable loan.38  Nevertheless, the 
 
money; but agreeing that the business profits from the criminal activity should be taxed the same 
manner as the profits from a lawful activity, if the criminal activity constituted a business).  
 29.  Id. at 137.  Cf. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining 
“gross income” as “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.”). 
 30. Id. at 138. 
 31. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).  See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as amended in 
1993) (including illegal gains into gross income).  See generally Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (RIA) ¶ J-
1601 (listing, with citations, cases in which income derived from questionable transactions or 
businesses was included, or not included, in income, including: bookmaking; bootleg liquor; bribes; 
campaign contributions in exchange for a politician’s influence; drugs; embezzlement; espionage; 
extortion; fraudulent schemes; graft; illegal bonus to corporate director; kickbacks; profits from illegal 
use of corporate assets; prostitution and massage; skimming of receipts; slot machines; swindling; 
transactions in foreign currency obtained at illegal exchange rates; unlawful insurance policies; and 
usurious interest). 
 32. James 366 U.S. at 221–22.  
 33. Id. at 214.  
 34. Id. at 221. 
 35. Id. at 219. 
 36. Id. at 220. 
 37. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 4.06, at 4–42. 
 38. See Norman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 181 (1968), aff’d per curiam, 407 F.2d 1337 
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Internal Revenue Service (Service) allows the netting of the amount of the 
repayment from the amount misappropriated when the misappropriation 
and the repayment occur in the same tax year.39  If restitution is made to the 
victim, a deduction is allowed for the amount paid in the year of the 
repayment.40  An exception to inclusion may have been carved out if there 
is a consensual recognition of the obligation to repay.41 
In Gilbert v. Commissioner,42 the taxpayer, who was president, 
principal stockholder, and director of a corporation, made unauthorized 
withdrawals of nearly $2,000,000 of corporate funds.43  Believing that he 
was acting in the best interest of the corporation, the taxpayer withdrew the 
funds to facilitate the merger of another company into the corporation.44  
The taxpayer promptly informed several, but not all, of the corporate 
officers and directors of the withdrawals.45  Within two weeks, the taxpayer 
made a complete accounting of the withdrawals to the corporation’s 
directors, officers, and outside counsel, and signed demand notes secured 
by the assignment of property with a net value in excess of the amount 
withdrawn.46  The Board of Directors accepted the notes and assignment 
but refused to ratify the unauthorized withdrawals.47  In time, the Service 
filed tax liens against the taxpayer and the corporation, which failed to file 
the assignment, was subordinate in priority to the tax lien.48  Finding no 
consensual recognition of the obligation to repay because the corporation 
was unaware of the withdrawals, the Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer 
realized income when he made the unauthorized withdrawals from the 
corporation and that his efforts at restitution did not entitle him to an offset 
 
(3d Cir. 1969) (entering into a repayment agreement with the employer does not convert the receipt of 
embezzled funds into a loan); Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975) (giving a 
promissory note to the victimized bank does not prevent the funds from being included in the 
embezzler’s gross income); Taylor v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1197 (1997) (executing a 
confession of judgement note to the victimized bank in the year of the check-kiting scheme does not 
convert the income from the check-kiting scheme into a loan). But see Gaddy v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 943 
(1962), reversed in part on other issues, 344 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that where the taxpayer 
mistakenly obtains funds and in the same year recognizes a fixed and definite obligation to repay and 
makes provision for repayment, the taxpayer is not required to include the amount obtained in income 
even though repayment occurred in a later year). 
 39. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. CC:TL-N-2502-94 (Apr. 8, 1994). 
 40. See infra text accompanying notes 280-306 (detailing the tax treatment of restitution 
payments). 
 41. Donald DePass, Reconsidering the Classification of Illegal Income, 66 TAX LAW. 771, 777 
(2013). 
 42. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 552 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1977).  
 43. Id. at 479. 
 44. Id. at 481. 
 45. Id. at 479. 
 46. Id. at 481. 
 47. Id. at 480.  
 48. Id. 
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against his income.49 
The Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held, based on the 
atypical facts of the case, that the funds withdrawn were not income to the 
taxpayer.50  The Second Circuit did not interpret James to require the 
realization of income in every case of unlawful withdrawals by a 
taxpayer.51  The Second Circuit stated: 
We conclude that where a taxpayer withdraws funds from a 
corporation which he fully intends to repay and which he expects 
with reasonable certainty he will be able to repay, where he 
believes that his withdrawals will be approved by the corporation, 
and where he makes a prompt assignment of assets sufficient to 
secure the amount owed, he does not realize income on the 
withdrawals under the James test.  When Gilbert acquired the 
money, there was an express consensual recognition of his 
obligation to repay: the secretary of the corporation, who signed 
the checks, the officers and directors to whom Gilbert gave 
contemporaneous notification, and Gilbert himself were all aware 
that the transaction was in the nature of a loan.52 
The theft-loan dichotomy may be relevant if the taxpayer is claiming to 
borrow money for legitimate business reasons but is actually engaged in 
swindling investors.53  The proceeds from a bona fide loan are not included 
in income because the financial benefit is offset by a contemporaneously 
acknowledged obligation to repay.54  Although whether a bona fide debtor-
creditor relationship exists is a question of fact, an essential element is the 
intent of the recipient of the funds to repay and the intent of the person 
advancing the funds to require repayment.55  However, a swindler is 
obtaining money through a false pretense or device; therefore, the amount 
of money obtained is included in the income of the swindler.56 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 481–82.  Cf. Collins v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 625 (2nd Cir. 1993) (distinguishing 
Gilbert, the court found that the larcenist had no reasonable expectation in his ability to repay, had no 
reason to believe his employer would approve his actions, and was not motivated by assisting his 
employer). 
 51. Gilbert, 552 F.2d at 481. 
 52. Id. at 481–82. 
 53. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 4.06, at 4-4243.  
 54. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983). 
 55. Welch v. Commissioner, 204 F.3rd 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000).  Although no single factor is 
determinative, factors considered in determining whether a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship exists 
include: (1) whether the promise to repay is evidenced by a note or other instrument; (2) whether 
interest is charged; (3) whether a fixed schedule for repayments is made; (4) whether collateral is given 
to secure payment; (5) whether repayments are made; (6) whether the borrower has a reasonable 
prospect of repaying the loan and whether the lender has sufficient funds to advance the loan; and (7) 
whether the parties conduct themselves as if the transaction is a loan. Id. 
 56. Rollinger v. United States, 208 F2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1953). 
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In In Re Diversifies Brokers Co., Inc.,57 the Eighth Circuit refused to 
follow the holding of the Supreme Court in James.58  The principal source 
of income of the corporate taxpayer was cash received from lenders, who 
were promised high rates of interest and misled as to the taxpayer’s 
business, in exchange for short-term notes issued by the taxpayer.59  Before 
the maturity date of each note, the noteholder had the option to redeem the 
note for cash, or accept a new note for the face amount of the old note and 
receive accrued interest in either cash or an additional note.60  In fact, the 
taxpayer was not engaged in any profitable business, and the corporate 
officers were illegally diverting a substantial portion of the corporate funds 
for their own use.61  The activity of the taxpayer was a Ponzi-type scheme 
under which the corporation was obtaining more loans in order to pay off 
the previous loans.62  Eventually, the officers were convicted of securities 
and mail fraud, and the corporation was put in receivership for violations of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.  In addition, the U.S. government 
filed a claim against the bankrupted corporation for unpaid income tax plus 
interest.63 
The Bankruptcy Referee denied the government’s claim that the 
amounts “borrowed” from investors by the corporation were income, 
finding: (1) the transactions were bona fide loans as between the taxpayer 
and the lenders; (2) the taxpayer honored all requests for repayment, made 
substantial repayments, and had a considerable bank balance at time of 
receivership; and (3) the taxpayer was a mere conduit and received no 
benefit from the receipt of the funds.64  The Referee concluded that it would 
be ‘unthinkable’ to tax the bankrupted corporation on its receipts thereby 
substantially impairing the ability of the innocent lenders to recover their 
 
 57. Diversified Brokers Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1973). See Kreimer v. 
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 260 (1983) (stating that the issue is not whether the taxpayers 
engaged in improper conduct but whether they intended to repay the funds, “a finding of fraudulent 
conduct does not in itself establish the lack of intent to repay”). But see Moore v. United States, 412 
F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding that although the swindler had an intention and contractual obligation 
to make repayments, no agreement existed between the actual lender and borrower, establishing a 
“consensual recognition” of an obligation to repay and the exact conditions of repayment); O’Sheeran 
v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 405 (1983) (holding that funds borrowed from the corporation 
were includible in income because the taxpayer had total control over the funds, deposited the funds 
into a personal account, and used the funds to support himself without obligation or intention of 
repayment); United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748 (1967) (finding that the funds were included in the 
income of a confidence man even though the victims “lent” the money to the swindler). 
 58. Diversified Brokers Co., 487 F.2d at 358.  See supra text accompanying notes 31-38 
(discussing the James decision in which Supreme Court rejected the theft-loan dichotomy). 
 59. Id. at 355. 
 60. Id. at 35556. 
 61. Id. at 356. 
 62.  Id. at 355. 
 63. Id. at 35657. 
 64. Id. at 357.  
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loans.”65  The District Court affirmed the Referee’s decision and adopted 
his opinion.66  Although recognizing that the taxpayer was unable to repay 
all of the loans with interest because of the pyramiding nature of the 
scheme and the corporate officers’ embezzlements, the Eighth Circuit 
agreed with the District Court that the James decisions was not 
controlling.67  The record supported the Referee’s findings that there was an 
express agreement to repay the loans with interest and many repayments 
were made, and the proceeds of the loans were used for the benefit of the 
officers and not the taxpayer.68  The James decision applies to the corporate 
officers, requiring them to include the funds embezzled from the 
corporation in their income.69  The Eighth Circuit also stated that the 
government’s underlying reason for extending the James rational to this 
case and similar cases was, “[i]ts chances of gaining additional tax 
revenues at the expense of the defrauded lenders would be substantially 
increased.”70 
 
B. FIFTH AMENDMENT AND AL CAPONE 
 
The Fifth Amendment mandates “No person shall . . . be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . .”71  As interpreted, a 
taxpayer may assert Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 
testimonial self-incrimination.72  To claim the privilege, a defendant must 
be faced with a situation in which the hazards of self-incrimination are 
“real and appreciable” and not merely “imaginary and unsubstantial.”73  
The privilege encompasses not only answers that would in themselves 
support a conviction but also “embraces those which would furnish a link 
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal 
crime.”74  In tax matters, the Fifth Amendment may be asserted in civil or 
criminal investigations, litigation, and prosecutions.75  The party seeking to 
deny access to evidence must establish the basis for the privilege.76 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 358. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 72. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000). 
 73. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968). 
 74. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
 75. MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ¶ 12.05[12][b][ii] 
(2nd ed. 1991).  See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 66263 (1976) (finding that the privilege 
against self-incrimination is an absolute defense to Section 7203, penalty for willful failure to file a tax 
return).  See infra text accompanying notes 195200 (discussing the criminal fraud penalty provided in 
Section 7203, willful failure to file a return, supply information, or pay tax). 
 76. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 12.05[12][a]. 
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As previously stated, the Supreme Court, in Sullivan, agreed with the 
Fourth Circuit that income from illegal bootlegging was taxable but 
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s requirement that a tax return violated 
the bootlegger’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.77  
The not filing of a tax return or the filing of an incomplete tax return is not 
protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.78  Thus, the taxpayer cannot 
make a blanket refusal to file a tax return or to furnish the information 
requested but must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to the specific 
information required on the tax return.79  With regard to criminal activity, 
the information required on the tax return that may be incriminating is the 
source of income, type of business, and amount of income.80  Tax returns 
filed under penalties of perjury are a source of evidence for the government 
against taxpayers in an ongoing criminal investigation, in a civil tax audit 
with a potential for criminal referral, or with regard to illegal sources of 
income.81 
As tax cases are often document cases, the taxpayer’s ability to assert 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against the production of documents is 
critical.82  The Supreme Court has held that documents not prepared under 
compulsion are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.83  For 
example, business records of a sole proprietorship are not privileged under 
the Fifth Amendment because the records are prepared voluntarily.84  
Similarly, as the privilege is personal to the taxpayer, business and tax 
records held by the taxpayer’s accountant85 or prepared by the taxpayer’s 
accountant and transferred to the taxpayer’s attorney86 are not protected by 
the Fifth Amendment privilege.  However, under the right circumstances, 
documents voluntarily prepared may fall under another privilege such as 
the attorney-client privilege.87 
As a consequence of the inclusion of illegal income into income, the 
government has used the tax laws to punish a wrongdoer for the criminal 
 
 77. Sullivan II, 274 U.S. at 263. See supra text accompanying notes 8–17 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s holding, in Sullivan II, that the profits from a bootlegging operation were included in income). 
 78. Id.  But see Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 4142 (holding the defendant’s assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment valid if the information required on the tax return is for general criminal conduct). 
 79. Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228, 240 (9th Cir. 1974), aff’d, Gardner v. United States, 424 
U.S. 648 (1976). A tax return that does not contain the necessary information necessary to compute the 
taxpayer’s tax liability is not a return within the meaning of the Code. United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 
519, 523 (10th Cir. 1970). 
 80. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 12.05[12][b][iii]. 
 81. Stephen E. Silver, The “Tax Crime Exception” to Taking the Fifth Does Not Exist, 86 J. TAX’N 
224, 224 (April 1997). 
 82. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 12.05[12][b][iv]. 
 83. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000). 
 84. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984). 
 85. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973). 
 86. Fisher v. United States 425 U.S. 391 413–14,  (1976). 
 87. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 12.05[12][b][iv]. 
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conduct that generated the income and not to enforce the tax laws or 
penalize for the failure to comply with the tax laws.88  In 1931, Alphonse 
Capone, a gangster during the Prohibition era, was prosecuted, convicted, 
and sentenced to eleven years imprisonment for tax evasion.89  This 
selective enforcement of the tax laws against taxpayers with income from 
illegal sources is referred to as the “Al Capone syndrome.”90  The concern 
is using the tax laws to punish wrongdoers whose principal offense are 
other crimes, such as racketeering, black market activities, or giving or 
accepting bribes.91  Conversely, if the wrongdoer is guilty of two crimes, 
the crime under the tax laws should not be ignored because the other more 
serious crime is not being prosecuted.92  Selective prosecution raises an 
additional concern of whether the wrongdoer can receive a fair trial.93  The 
evidence presented in a tax fraud case of the taxpayer’s criminal history 
and associations may color the conclusions of the jury.94 
 
C. RECONSTRUCTING INCOME 
 
The scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, with respect to the inclusion of illegal income on tax returns, 
remains unclear.95  If included, wrongdoers often supply a name, address, 
and net income, label the income “miscellaneous income” or “income from 
various sources,” and leave the rest of the tax return blank.96  Such tax 
returns invite scrutiny by the Service; however, taxpayers are rarely 
prosecuted for failure to supply complete information.97  Instead, the 
Service attempts to verify the amounts of income listed on the tax return by 
 
 88. Boris I. Bittker, Taxing Income from Unlawful Activities, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 130, 131–
32 (1974-75).  See generally id..at 130 (discussing the pros and cons of the inclusion of illegal income 
into gross income and the “Al Capone syndrome”). 
 89. Bittker, supra note 88, at 130–31, 141.  See Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 
1932) (upholding the conviction of Alphonse Gabriel Capone for willfully attempting to evade and 
defeat income tax).  See also Capone v. United States, 51 f.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931) (upholding the 
conviction of Raffaele (Ralph “Bottles”) James Capone, mobster and older brother of Al Capone, for 
willfully failing to pay tax, resulting in a sentenced of three years imprisonment). 
 90. Bittker, supra note 88, at 141.  See id. at 140 (discussing possible methods of discouraging 
discriminatory enforcement, including the exemption of unlawful income and the granting of tax 
immunity to any taxpayer whose return was selected for audit in an irregular manner). 
 91. 6 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 6 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GIFTS ¶ 114.9.1 at 11480 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 2nd ed. 2012). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Bittker, supra note 88, at 142–43. 
 94. Id.  See id. (arguing that a tax evasion trial may require only minimal reference to the 
wrongdoer’s illegal activities and that the judge in a criminal case can exert sufficient authority over the 
jury to insure a fair trial.) 
 95. Bittker, supra note 88, at 133. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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examining the taxpayer’s financial history.98 
A taxpayer is under the obligation to “keep such records, render such 
statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations 
as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe.”99  If the taxpayer fails to 
file a return or files an inaccurate return, or did not keep records or kept 
inaccurate records, the Service is given “great latitude” in determining the 
taxpayer’s taxable income.100  The Service is not required to use any 
particular method of reconstructing income, but may use any method that 
clearly reflects the taxable income of the taxpayer.101  Although the Service 
has the initial burden of proof, the Service’s reconstruction of taxable 
income is presumed correct, and the taxpayer has the burden of proving 
that the deficiency notice is arbitrary, capricious, and excessive.102  Finally, 
although courts do not require the computation to be exact, the Service 
must employ reasonable means and be relatively exact when determining 
the taxpayer’s taxable income.103 
The foundation for the calculation of assessments and penalties is 
taxable income.104  Depending on the facts and circumstances of each 
investigation, a taxpayer’s taxable income may be established by direct or 
several indirect methods of proof.105  The method most preferred by the 
Service is the direct method, referred to as the specific item method.106  The 
specific item method of reconstructing income uses a taxpayer’s books and 
records in which transactions are contemporaneously recorded and then 
summarized on the tax return.107  If a taxpayer fails to keep adequate books 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. I.R.C. § 6001 (West 2017). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (as amended in 1990) (requiring 
taxpayers to “keep permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to 
establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required to be shown by such 
person in any return of tax or information”). 
 100. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1150 (T.C. 1980). 
 101. Id.  The method used by the government to reconstruct income is not conclusive, allowing the 
taxpayer to present alternative methods that may be more accurate.  Kikalos v. United States, 408 F.3d 
900, 903 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 102. Elizabeth M. Rutherford, Taxation of Drug Traffickers’ Income: What the Drug Trafficker 
Profiteth the IRS Taketh Away, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 716 (1991).  Once the Service determines gross 
income, the taxpayer generally has the burden to prove deductions. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, 
supra note 6, ¶ 43.01 at 432.  
 103. Rutherford, supra note 102, at 71314. 
 104. Id. at 712.  Generally, the term “taxable income” means a taxpayer’s gross income minus 
deductions.  I.R.C. § 63(a) (West 2017). 
 105. I.R.S. IRM § 9.5.9.2(4) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-
009.html#d0e70.  Generally, the special agent will gather evidence to determine the amount of income 
that the taxpayer should on the tax return and compare that to the amount of income included on the tax 
return.  Id. § 9.5.9.2.2(1). 
 106. Id.  Even if the direct method is used to reconstruct taxable income, an indirect method may be 
used to determine the accuracy of the taxpayer’s books and records.  BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, 
supra note 6, ¶ 43.01, at 432.  
 107. I.R.S IRM 9.5.9.2.1(1) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009. 
html#d0e70.  The three types of schemes suited for the use of the specific item method are: (1) 
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and records, an indirect method of reconstructing taxable income may be 
employed.108  The indirect methods of proving income that the courts 
upheld are: (1) net worth method; (2) expenditures method; and (3) bank 
deposit method.109  Courts have only sustained the findings of fraud if the 
taxpayer offers no adequate explanation for the discrepancies between the 
expenditures, bank deposits, and increases in net worth and the amount of 
income reported on the tax return.110 
 
1. Net Worth Method 
 
The net worth method measures the increase in net worth of the 
taxpayer calculated at the beginning and end of each tax year.111  A legacy 
of the prohibition era, the net worth method is well suited to search out 
unreported income, particularly income from illegal sources.112  This 
method of income reconstruction was used to prosecute such notorious 
crime figures as the Capones.113  The net worth method is used by the 
Service if the taxpayer maintains no books and records or if the taxpayer’s 
books and records are not available, inadequate, or withheld.114  The 
assumption is that the taxpayer’s increase in net worth, plus the taxpayer’s 
nondeductible personal expenses, must have been financed by taxable and 
nontaxable income.115  Generally, the difference in the taxpayer’s net worth 
from the previous tax year is increased by the amount of personal living 
expenses, nondeductible losses, and gifts made, and decreased by any 
nontaxable sources of funds, such as gifts and inheritances.116  The Service 
must establish an opening net worth with reasonable certainty and prove 
 
understatement of income; (2) overstatement of expenses; and (3) fraudulent claims for credits or 
exemptions.  Id. § 9.5.9.2.1(2).  See Durland v. Commissioner, 112 T.C.M. (CCH) 37 (2016) (holding 
that stipulations that the taxpayer received certain payments and that he did not keep adequate records 
were sufficient to allow the presumption of correctness to attach to the Service’s determinations and 
justified using the specific items method of reconstructing income). 
 108. Rutherford, supra note 102, at 712. 
 109. I.R.S. IRM 9.5.9.2.2(3) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009. 
html#d0e70.  Two additional indirect methods used by the Service to prove income are the percentage 
markup method and the unit and volume method.  See id. § 9.5.9.1(1). 
 110. Id. at § 9.5.9.2.2(3). 
 111. Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, How the IRS Reconstructs Income Without Records, 42 
TAX’N FOR ACCT. (Jan 1992).  See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 129 (1954) (sanctioning the 
use of the net worth method of reconstructing taxable income). 
 112. Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky:  Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems of 
Proof, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421, 1426–27 (1991). 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94 (describing the “Al Capone syndrome”). 
 114. I.R.S. IRM § 9.5.9.5.2(1) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/ part9/irm_09-005-009. 
html#d0e70. 
 115. Knight & Knight, supra note 111. 
 116. See generally I.R.S. IRM § 9.5.9.5.8.1 (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/ 
part9/irm_09-005-009.html#d0e70.  See also id., at § 9.5.9.5.8.1(3). 
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the unreported income came from a known and likely source.117  The most 
common defense used by taxpayers is that the increase in net worth was 
caused by a substantial “hoard” of cash from previous years of saving.118 
 
2. Expenditures Method 
 
The expenditures method compares the taxpayer’s expenditures with 
the taxpayer’s receipt of income.119  The assumption is that the amount by 
which the taxpayer’s expenditures during the tax year exceeds know 
sources of income, if unexplained, represent unreported income.120  This 
method is similar to the net worth method of reconstructing income.121  The 
expenditures method of proof is used if the taxpayer’s net worth has not 
substantially changed during the period under investigation or when 
significant extravagant living expenditures are apparent.122  Thus, the 
taxpayer has spent substantial income on consumable goods and services, 
such as food, vacations, and gifts, as opposed to durable goods, such as 
stocks, bonds, and real estate.123  Typically, taxpayers claim that 
expenditures and increased bank balances are the result of previously 
earned income, funds held for other parties, or nontaxable loans.124 
 
3. Bank Deposit Method 
 
The bank deposit method is a means of verifying the taxpayer’s 
receipts and expenditures.125  The premise is that the taxpayer’s bank 
deposits represent income and, if not income, the taxpayer is in the best 
position to explain the nature of the deposits.126  The bank deposit method 
requires an analysis of the taxpayer’s bank account(s), which may reveal 
unreported income or provide leads to unreported income by tracing the 
deposits to their source.127  The Service does not have to prove that the 
 
 117. Eads, supra note 112, at 142729.  See id., at 142948 (discussing, in detail, the difficulty in 
establishing a likely source of nontaxable income and an opening net worth, and the willingness of 
appellate courts to affirm convictions despite the government’s inability to meet the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 118. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 127 (1954). 
 119. Knight & Knight, supra note 111. 
 120. Id.  See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) (sanctioning the use of the expenditures 
method of reconstructing taxable income). 
 121. Knight & Knight, supra note 111. 
 122. I.R.S. IRM § 9.5.9.6.2(1) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009. 
html#d0e70. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Jim Swayze and John C. Zimmerman, IRS Steps Up Indirect Methods of Establishing Income, 
52 TAX’N FOR ACCT. (Feb 1994). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Knight & Knight, supra note 111. 
 127. Rutherford, supra note 102, at 728. 
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bank deposits are income or establish a likely source of unreported income 
as the taxpayer has the burden of proving the deposits represent nontaxable 
income.128  Bank deposit reconstructions are justified when the taxpayer has 
no or inadequate records or the Service has strong suspicion that the 
taxpayer has undisclosed income.129  Again, defenses include undisclosed 
gifts, cash hoards, and funds belonging to other parties.130 
 
D. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CIVIL PENALTIES 
 
Taxpayers engaged in unlawful activities are often liable for unpaid 
taxes and civil and criminal penalties.  “Congress has imposed a variety of 
sanctions for the protection of the system and the revenues.”131  Civil fraud 
results in remedial action by the Service, such as assessing the correct tax 
and imposing civil penalties as additions to tax, which are assessed and 
collected administratively as part of the unpaid balance of assessment.132  
Criminal fraud results in punitive action with penalties consisting of fines 
and/or imprisonment, which are enforced only by prosecution and are 
intended to punish the taxpayer.133  Criminal penalties serve as a deterrent 
to other taxpayers.134 
 
1. Civil Penalties 
 
The major difference between civil and criminal fraud is the degree of 
proof required by the government.135  In civil cases, the government must 
present sufficient evidence to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence 
while in criminal cases guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.136  
Generally, in civil court proceedings, the taxpayer bears the burden of 
proof until the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to 
relevant factual issues.137  Nevertheless, the Service has the initial burden to 
 
 128. Knight & Knight, supra note 111. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943). 
 132. I.R.S. IRM § 25.1.1.2.3(1) (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-001-
001.html#d0e119.  If an addition to tax is assessed, the taxpayer also owes interest, compounded daily 
from the due date of the return, on both the underpayment and addition to tax.  See I.R.C. § 6601(a), 
(e)(2) (West 2017); see also § 6621 (establishing the interest rate on underpayments as three percent 
over the federal short-term rate determined under Section 1274(d)); § 6622 (West 2017) (establishing 
that interest compounds daily); § 6665(a) (West 2017) (treating additions to tax in the same matter as 
the income tax). 
 133. I.R.S. IRM § 25.1.1.2.3(2) (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/ part25/irm_25-001-
001.html#d0e119. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. § 25.1.1.2.2(2). 
 136. Id. 
 137. I.R.C. § 7491(a) (West 2017). 
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produce evidence to impose a penalty, an addition to tax, or an additional 
amount imposed by the tax laws.138 
It has been stated that the Internal Revenue Code contains “a mind-
numbing assortment” of civil penalties.139  The following are the civil tax 
penalties that commonly apply to taxpayers involved in illegal activities: 
 
a. I.R.C. Section 6651—Failure to File a Tax Return or to Pay Tax 
 
If a taxpayer fails to file a tax return or fails to pay the tax shown, or 
required to have been shown, on a tax return, a penalty is imposed unless 
the taxpayer shows that the delay resulted from a reasonable cause and not 
willful neglect.140  The penalty for failure to file a return is five percent of 
the amount the taxpayer was required to show for the first month, plus an 
additional five percent for each month thereafter, not to exceed twenty-five 
percent.141  If the failure to file is due to fraudulent intent, the penalty for 
failure to file a timely tax return increases to fifteen percent per month with 
a maximum of seventy-five percent.142  The Service has the burden to prove 
the failure to file was with fraudulent intent in order to impose the penalty 
for fraud.143  The penalty for failure to pay the tax in a timely manner is 0.5 
percent of the amount shown on the tax return for the first month, plus an 
additional 0.5 percent for each month thereafter, not to exceed twenty-five 
percent.144 
Generally, the Service will not impose the failure to file or pay penalty 
on any portion of an underpayment if the taxpayer can show a reasonable 
and good faith effort to comply.145  Special circumstances that warrant 
relief include the following: (1) taxpayer exercised ordinary business care 
or prudence but due to circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control was 
unable to comply with the tax law; (2) death, serious injury, or unavoidable 
 
 138. § 7491(c). 
 139. Michael Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns, 23 UCLA L. 
REV. 637, 637 (1976). 
 140. I.R.C. § 6651(a) (West 2017). 
     141. § 6651(a)(1).  If a timely return is not filed, the taxpayer will usually fail to pay the tax due and 
will therefore be subject to penalties for both failure to file and late payment; however, in such 
circumstance, the penalties will offset each other so that the net result will equal the failure to file 
penalty. § 6651(c)(1). 
 142. § 6651(f). 
 143. I.R.C. § 7454 (West 2017).  See infra text accompanying notes 167-71 (listing the factors 
considered by the Service in establishing fraudulent intent). 
 144. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2), (3). 
 145. I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.1.3.2.1 (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-
001r.html. For relief from the failure to file or pay penalty, the taxpayer must make an affirmative 
showing of all facts alleged as a reasonable cause for the failure to file or pay. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-
1(c)(1) (as amended in 2004).  The Supreme Court held that relief is warranted if a taxpayer relied on 
an attorney or accountant for advice on a matter of tax law but not if a taxpayer relied on a tax advisor 
to prepare and file a timely tax return.  United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1985). 
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absence of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s immediate family; (3) fire, 
casualty, natural disaster, or other disturbance; (4) inability to obtain 
records necessary to comply with a tax obligation; and (5) receipt of, and 
reliance on, erroneous tax advice.146  Reasonable cause is shown for failure 
to pay tax if the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence but 
was unable to pay or would suffer undue hardship if payment was made on 
the due date. 147  Lavish or extravagant personal spending and speculative or 
illiquid investments are inconsistent with a showing of reasonable care and 
prudence.148 
 
b. I.R.C. Section 6662—Accuracy Related Penalty on Underpayments 
 
The accuracy related penalty on underpayments attaches to specified 
proscribed conduct, including: (1) negligence or disregard of tax rules and 
regulations;149 and (2) a substantial underpayment of tax.150  Generally, the 
accuracy related penalty will not be imposed on any portion of an 
underpayment if the taxpayer shows a reasonable and good faith effort to 
comply with the tax laws.151  The penalty is twenty percent of the 
underpayment attributable to the proscribed conduct.152 
With regard to the penalty for “negligence or disregard of rule or 
regulations,” the term “negligence” includes any failure to make a 
reasonable attempt to comply with the tax laws, exercise ordinary care in 
tax return preparation, or keep adequate books and records.153  The penalty 
for negligence will not apply if the taxpayer’s position has a reasonable 
basis.154  “Disregard” includes any careless, reckless, or intentional 
 
 146. I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.1.3.2.2 (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-
001r.html; § 20.1.1.3.2.2(1); § 20.1.1.3.2.2(2); § 20.1.1.3.2.2(3); § 20.1.1.3.2.2(5). 
 147. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2004).  For purposes of an extension of the time 
for payment of tax, the term “undue hardship” means more than inconvenience but means substantial 
financial loss, e.g., sale of property at a sacrifice price, will result from payment on the due date.  Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6161-1(b) (as amended in 1973). 
 148. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2004).  
 149. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1), (c) (West 2017). 
 150. § 6662(b)(2), (d).  The additional proscribed conduct for which the accuracy related penalty 
imposed are: (1) any substantial valuation misstatement; (2) any substantial overstatement of pension 
liabilities; (3) any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement; and (4) transactions lacking 
economic substance. § 6662(b).  The penalty is increased to forty percent in the case of nondisclosed 
noneconomic substance transactions. § 6662(i). 
 151. § 6664(c)(1). 
 152. § 6662(a).  The maximum accuracy related penalty that will apply is twenty percent of the 
understatement even though the understatement is attributable to two or more of the proscribed 
conducts. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c) (as amended in 2003). 
 153. I.R.C. § 6662(c) (West 2017); see also I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.5.7.1(1) (2016), https://www. 
irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html; Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (as amended in 2003) (providing 
details of the statutory definition of “negligence”). 
 154. I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.5.7.1(3) (2016), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html. 
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disregard of tax statutes and regulations.155  The penalty for disregard of tax 
statutes and regulations does not apply if the taxpayer adequately discloses 
the position and the position represents a good faith challenge to the 
regulations.156 
A “substantial understatement” of tax occurs if the amount of the 
understatement exceeds the greater of: (1) ten percent of the tax required to 
be shown on the return; or (2) $5,000.157  The accuracy related penalty will 
not be imposed on any portion of an underpayment if the taxpayer shows a 
reasonable and good faith effort to comply with the tax laws.158  The 
amount of the understatement is reduced by the portion attributed to: (1) 
substantial authority for the position taken; or (2) relevant facts adequately 
disclosed on the tax return and a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of 
the item.159  The penalty imposed by I.R.C. section 6662 will not apply to 
any portion of an underpayment for which a fraud penalty is imposed by 
I.R.C. section 6663.160 
 
c. I.R.C. Section 6663—Imposition of Civil Fraud Penalty 
 
Typically, the civil fraud penalty is imposed on a taxpayer generating 
illegal income.161  The amount of the penalty is seventy-five percent of the 
portion of the underpayment attributable to fraud.162  The Service must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the taxpayer is guilty of 
fraudulent intent to evade taxes.163  Once the Service establishes that any 
portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud, the entire 
underpayment is so treated, except any portion of the underpayment that 
the taxpayer establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, not to be 
attributable to fraud.164  The fraud penalty is not imposed on any portion of 
the underpayment if the taxpayer shows a reasonable and good faith effort 
to comply with the tax laws.165  I.R.C. section 6663 applies only to tax 
returns filed; nevertheless, pursuant to I.R.C. section 6651(f), a 
 
 155. I.R.C. § 6662(c). 
 156. I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.5.7.2.1(3) (2016), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html. 
 157. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A). 
 158. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2017).  
 159. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B).  If any portion of the understatement is attributable to a tax shelter a 
more rigorous test is applied.  § 6662(d)(2)(C). 
 160. § 6662(b). 
 161. Megan L. Brackney, When Crime Doesn’t Pay: The Tax Consequences of Criminal Conduct, 
103 J. TAX’N 303, 304 (Nov 2005). 
 162. I.R.C. § 6663(a) (West 2017).  If a joint return is filed, the fraud penalty will not apply to a 
spouse unless some part of underpayment is due to the fraud of that spouse.  § 6663(c). 
 163. DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 873 (1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 16 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
 164. I.R.C. § 6663(b). 
 165. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2017).  Intent to evade is distinguished from “inadvertence, reliance 
on incorrect technical advice, sincerely held difference of opinion, negligence or carelessness.”  I.R.S. 
IRM § 25.1.6.1 (2016), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-001-006.html. 
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corresponding seventy-five percent delinquency penalty is imposed for 
fraudulent failure to file a tax return.  As to both I.R.C. sections 6663 and 
6651(f), the Service must apply the same standards in proving fraudulent 
intent.166 
As distinguished from negligence, fraud is always intentional.167  
Since direct proof of fraud is rarely available, the Service must prove fraud 
by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.168  Generally, fraud 
involves one or more of the following elements: deception; 
misrepresentation of material facts; false or altered documents; and 
evasion.169  Although a determination of fraud is based on a taxpayer’s 
entire course of action, some of the common indicators considered by the 
Service in evidencing an “intent to evade tax” are as follows: (1) 
understatement of income, e.g., omission of specific items or sources of 
income or substantial income; (2) fictitious or improper deductions, e.g., 
overstatement of expenses; (3) accounting irregularities, e.g., two sets of 
books and false entries; (4) obstructive actions of the taxpayer, e.g., false 
statements, destruction of records, transfer or concealment of assets, and 
failure to cooperate with the examiner; (5) consistent pattern of 
underreporting income; (6) implausible or inconsistent explanations; (7) 
engaging in illegal activities or attempting to conceal illegal activities; (8) 
inadequate records; (9) dealing in cash; (10) failure to file returns; and (11) 
education and experience.170  Deficiencies resulting from the exercise of 
judgement, a good faith misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief 
that the taxpayer is not violating the law, are seldom the basis for the fraud 
penalty.171 
 
2. Criminal Penalties 
 
Criminal tax penalties, which include fines and/or terms of 
imprisonment, may also be imposed on perpetrators of illegal activities.  
Unlike civil penalties, criminal penalties are not collected through the 
assessment procedures but are imposed after conviction in criminal 
proceedings.172  Although criminal fraud provisions often encompass the 
 
 166. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.04[2], at 50-12.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 140-48 (describing the failure to file penalty imposed by I.R.C. § 6651). 
 167. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.06, at 50-33.  Tax fraud is an intentional 
wrongdoing with the specific purpose of evading a tax owed, requiring both a tax due and owing and 
fraudulent intent.  I.R.S. IRM § 25.1.1.2 (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-
001-001.html#d0e119. 
 168. I.R.S. IRM § 25.1.6.3(1) (2016), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-001-
006.html 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. § 25.1.6.3(2). 
 171. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.06, at 50-3435. 
 172. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943).  The government must bring an indictment 
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same conduct as the civil fraud penalty,173 the government must prove 
criminal fraud by the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.174  In 
any court proceeding involving the question of fraud with the intent to 
evade taxes, the burden of proof with respect to fraud is on the 
government.175  The elements of the various criminal penalties also may 
overlap but all require the element of willfulness that is given the same 
interpretation for all of the criminal penalties.176  Unlike the civil penalty, 
the criminal provisions apply to more than just the taxpayer, allowing the 
government to prosecute individuals aiding the taxpayer, including 
employees, accountants, lawyers, and tax preparers.177 
 
a. I.R.C. Section 7201—Attempt to Evade Tax 
 
A taxpayer who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the 
payment of any tax, in addition to other penalties provided by law,178 is 
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, will be fined not more than 
$100,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, together with 
the costs of prosecution.179  The Supreme Court described the criminal 
fraud penalty: 
[W]e consider this felony as the capstone of a system of sanctions 
which singly or in combination were calculated to induce prompt 
 
for a tax crime within three years after the commission of the offense. I.R.C. § 6531 (West 2017).  
Except that the statute of limitations is extended to six years for criminal penalties the result of the 
following activities: (1) offenses involving tax fraud; (2) willfully attempting to evade tax; (3) aiding or 
assisting the preparation of a fraudulent tax return; (4) willfully failing to pay tax; and (5) fraudulent 
and false statements and tax returns.  § 6531. 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 167-71 (discussing the elements of fraud and conduct 
indicative of fraud). 
 174. Spies, 317 U.S. at 495.  Imposition of a civil penalty after a criminal prosecution does not 
constitute double jeopardy.  BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.06, at 50-36.  A civil 
penalty may be imposed after an acquittal in a criminal prosecution as the Service’s burden of proof in 
the former is clear and convincing evidence and in the latter is beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 50-
3637.  
 175. I.R.C. § 7454(a) (West 2017). 
 176. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973). 
 177. 6 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 91, ¶ 114.9.1, at 114-8182.  In the penalty chapter of the 
Internal Revenue Code, the term “person” includes officers and employees of corporations and 
members and employees of partnerships. I.R.C. § 7343 (West 2017);  see also I.R.C. § 6694 (West 
2017) (subjecting tax preparers to civil penalties for negligent or willful attempts to understate a client’s 
tax liability); I.R.C. § 6701 (West 2017) (imposing civil penalties on persons who aid or abet the 
understatement of another person’s tax liability); I.R.C. § 7206(2) (West 2017) (imposing criminal 
penalties on persons who willfully aid or assist in the preparation of a tax return, affidavit, claim, or 
other document that is fraudulent or false as any material matter). 
 178. The phrase “other penalties provided by law” includes the civil fraud penalty and other 
statutory fines and prison terms if prosecution does not constitute double jeopardy.  BITTKER, 
MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6 ¶ 50.08[2], at 50-50.  See supra text accompanying notes 161-66 
(discussing the civil fraud penalty imposed by I.R.C. § 6663). 
 179. I.R.C. § 7201 (West 2017). 
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and forthright fulfillment of every duty under the income tax  
law . . ..180 
The three elements required by I.R.C. section 7201 are: (1) willfulness; (2) 
the existence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act constituting an 
evasion, or attempted evasion, of tax.181  With regard to the first 
requirement, the Supreme Court found that the term “willfulness” requires 
“a voluntary, intentional violation of a known duty.”182  Thus, willfulness 
does not include a “frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made 
despite the exercise of reasonable care.”183  For example, if the taxpayer, 
who failed to file a tax return for three years, acted in good faith on his 
belief that a tax return or payment of tax was not required because wages 
were not income, the element of willfulness is not present no matter how 
objectively unreasonable his belief.184  Willfulness can also be refuted by 
the demonstration of a good faith reliance on a tax advisor if all relevant 
facts were disclosed by the taxpayer.185  The element of willfulness can be 
inferred from facts and circumstances such as evidence of a consistent 
pattern of underreporting large amounts of income and the failure to 
include all income in books and records.186 
The second requirement is the existence of a tax deficiency.187  While 
a formal deficiency assessment is prima facie evidence of a deficiency, the 
taxpayer has the opportunity to prove that the assessment does not 
accurately reflect the existence of a tax deficiency.188  The government 
need not establish the exact dollar amount of tax owed, only the existence 
of a substantial deficiency.189  Sufficient is the allegation that the taxpayer 
knowingly and willfully attempted to evade income tax by the use of 
fraudulent devices, “resulting in many thousands of dollars of taxable but 
unreported income.”190 
The third requirement is an affirmative act constituting an evasion, or 
attempted evasion, of tax, which lifts the offense from a misdemeanor to a 
felony.191  Congress did not define or limit methods by which a willful 
 
 180. Spies, 317 U.S. at 497. 
 181. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965). 
 182. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 360. 
 183. Spies, 317 U.S. at 496. 
 184. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991). 
 185. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.08[2], at 50-5253. 
 186. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954). 
 187. The requirement of a tax deficiency is surprising as the language of the statute seemingly 
includes both successful and unsuccessful attempts to evade tax. 6 BORIS & LOKKEN, supra note 91, ¶ 
114.9.2, at 114-88; see id. (discussing the uncertainty as to whether and to what extent this prerequisite 
to prosecution must be met). 
 188. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.08[2], at 50-54. 
 189. United States v. Bucker, 610 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 190. Id. at 574. 
 191. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497–98 (1943). 
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evasion or attempted evasion of tax may be accomplished.192  Although the 
mere failure to file a tax return does not constitute an affirmative act of 
evasion,193 the requirement of an affirmative act of evasion or attempted 
evasion of tax can be inferred from conduct, including 
[K]eeping a double set of books, making false entries or 
alterations, or false invoices or documents, destruction of 
books or records, concealment of assets or covering up 
sources of income, handling of one’s affairs to avoid 
making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and 
any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead 
or to conceal.194 
 
b. I.R.C. Section 7203—Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, 
or Pay Tax 
 
A willful failure to file a tax return, keep records, supply information, 
or pay tax at the time required constitutes a misdemeanor subject to a fine 
of not more than $25,000, or imprisonment of not more than one year, or 
both, plus the costs of prosecution.195  Failure to file a return and pay tax, if 
the taxpayer knows the tax is due, is a willful omission and, as such, a 
misdemeanor.196  Tax evasion, however, must be proven by an affirmative 
act, such as filing a false return.197  Even if a taxpayer intends to file at a 
later date, a taxpayer that willfully fails to file will violate section 7203 
because the required intent is the intentional disregard of a legal obligation, 
and not the intent to defraud the government.198  A good faith belief that a 
tax return is not required is a defense to the charge of willful failure to file 
even if the belief is objectively unreasonable.199  Additionally, a good faith 
belief that the filing of a tax return violates the taxpayer’s privilege against 
self-incrimination is a defense to the charge of willful failure to file.200 
 
c. I.R.C. Sections 7206 and 7207—Fraudulent and False Statements 
 
Pursuant to I.R.C. section 7206, each of the following offenses 
constitutes a felony, punishable with a fine of not more than $100,000, or 
 
 192. Id. at 499. 
 193. Id. at 49798. 
 194. Id. at 499.  If tax evasion is a motive, the criminal fraud penalty may be imposed even though 
such conduct may also conceal other crimes.  
 195. I.R.C. § 7203 (West 2017).  
 196. Spies, 317 at 493. 
 197. Id. at 494. 
 198. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.08[5], at 50-5758. 
 199. Id. at 50-58. 
 200. Id.  See supra text accompanying notes 71-94 (discussing the application of the privilege 
against self-incrimination). 
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imprisonment of not more than three years, or both, plus the cost of 
prosecution: (1) willfully making a false declaration under penalty of 
perjury; (2) willfully aiding or assisting in the preparation of any return or 
other document, which is fraudulent or false as to any material matter; (3) 
willfully falsifying or fraudulently executing or signing any bond, permit, 
entry, or other document required by the tax laws; (4) willfully removing, 
depositing, or concealing property upon which tax is imposed, or levied, 
with intent to evade or defeat the assessment or collection of any tax; and 
(5) willfully concealing property or withholding, falsifying, or destroying 
records, or making any false statement in connection any compromise or 
closing agreement.  A conviction under this section can be based on a 
willful omission of a material fact as well as on an affirmative false 
statement.201  Although the defect must be material, the government does 
not have to prove that the Service relied on the false statement202 or that 
there was a tax deficiency.203  Pursuant to I.R.C. section 7207, a willful 
delivery or disclosure of fraudulent lists, records, accounts, statements, or 
other document is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than 
$10,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.  This section 
overlaps with I.R.C. sections 7201 and 7206(1)204 but, unlike the latter, 
I.R.C. section 7207, does not require the false statement to be made under 
the penalty of perjury.205 
The problem—epitomized by the crusader against organized crime 
who would indict a person for spitting on the sidewalk if the suspect’s more 
heinous crimes could not be established by sufficient evidence—is more 
complex than ordinarily recognized.206 
 
E. PRIORITY OF CLAIMS 
 
If a criminal is proven to have undeclared illegal income, the 
government’s claim for the taxes owed on the unreported income is often in 
competition with the victim’s claim for restitution.207  Under the tax lien 
provisions,208 the tax lien of the federal government may have priority over 
the lien of the victim.209  Although the priority of federal tax liens was not 
at issue in James,210 Justice Black, in his dissent, stated: “subjecting the 
 
 201. United States v. Tager, 479 F.2d 120, 122 (10th Cir. 1973). 
 202. United States v. Romanow, 509 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1975). 
 203. United States v. Jernigan, 411 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 927 (1969). 
 204. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349 (1965). 
 205. United States v. Levy, 533 F.2d 969, 974–75 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 206. 6 BORIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 91, ¶ 114.9.1, at 114-80. 
 207. PAUL R. MCDANIEL, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., DANIEL L. SIMMONS & GREGG D. POLSKY, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 180 (Foundation Press 6th ed. 2008). 
 208. I.R.C. §§ 63206323 (West 2017). 
 209. MCDANIEL, MCMAHON, SIMMONS & POLSKY, supra note 207. 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38 (discussing the Supreme Court’s opinion in James 
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embezzled funds to a tax would amount to allowing the United States a 
preferential claim for part of the dishonest gain, to the direct loss and 
detriment of those to whom it ought to be restored.”211 
If an individual fails to pay a tax liability after demand, I.R.C. section 
6321 provides that the unpaid tax, including interest, penalties, and costs, 
“shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to 
property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.”212  A tax lien 
takes effect retroactively as of the date of assessment and continues until 
the tax liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable due to the lapse of 
time.213  The Service must give the taxpayer notice of the assessment and 
demand payment as soon as practicable and within sixty days after making 
the assessment.214  The Service may levy on the taxpayer’s property if the 
taxpayer neglects or fails to pay the tax within ten days after notice and 
demand.215  In addition to the ten-day period, the Service must give notice 
of its intention to levy at least thirty days before the levy is made.216 
With regard to solvent taxpayers, the general rule is that “first in time” 
determines the priority of liens.217  Generally, state law determines the legal 
interest of the taxpayer in the property to which the tax lien can attach, and 
federal law determines the priority of the competing liens asserted against 
the taxpayer’s property or rights to property.218  Although valid against 
some third parties, an unfiled tax lien is not effective against four classes of 
claimants: purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic’s lienors, and 
judgement lien creditors.219  A tax lien does not attach to a purchaser of 
property if the purchase is for “adequate and full consideration in money 
 
that income from illegal activity is income despite the wrongdoer’s obligation to repay). 
 211. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 227 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 212. I.R.C. §§ 6321.  An assessment is the determination of the amount of taxes due, and a lien 
protects the government’s rights as a creditor.  6 BORIS & LOKKEN, supra note 91, ¶ 111.6.4, at 111-
15758. 
 213. § 6322. The government has ten years from the date of assessment to collect unpaid taxes 
unless the ten-year period is suspended or extended by agreement.  I.R.S. §§ 6502(a), 6503 (West 
2017).  Generally, a lien is a claim or charge on property for payment of debt; however, a transfer of 
property to satisfy a debt can only be effective by levy or seizer.  SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 
14.04. 
 214. I.R.C. § 6303(a) (West 2017). Nevertheless, the Service’s failure give notice within sixty days 
does not invalidate the notice. Treas. Reg. § 301.6303-1(a) (as amended in 2001). 
 215. I.R.C. § 6331(a) (2017). If the Service finds that collection is in jeopardy, the Service may give 
notice and demand for immediate payment and levy upon the taxpayer’s property without regard to the 
ten-day period.  Id.  
 216. § 6331(d). 
 217. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954); SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 
16.01.  See generally SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶¶ 16.07-16 (discussing the priority of tax 
liens of insolvent debtors and debtors in bankruptcy). 
 218. Aguilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513–14 (1960); SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 
14.07[1][e]. 
 219. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (West 2017). Even if filed, a tax lien is not valid against a class of 
“superpriority” interests listed in Section 6323(b).  See § 6334 (exempting certain categories of property 
from levy). 
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and money’s worth.”220  Thus, property subject to a bona fide sale prior to 
the filing of the tax lien is protected as the taxpayer no longer owns the 
property.221  The Service may not immediately record a tax lien because the 
filing of a tax lien may adversely affect the taxpayer’s ability to pay.222  
With regard to after acquired property, with few exceptions, a federal tax 
lien is always first in time. 223  A claimant, who under state law would have 
priority, may be subordinate to a subsequently filed tax lien if the 
claimant’s lien is “inchoate,” or unperfected, prior to the filing of the tax 
lien.224 
It is well established that illegally obtained funds are includable in the 
income of a wrongdoer.225  However, the question arises as to whether the 
government can levy upon specific property acquired with illegally 
obtained funds.226  In Dennis v. United States,227 the District Court found 
that a federal tax lien does not attach to property held by the embezzler and 
traceable to the victim.228  The threshold question addressed by the District 
Court was the ownership of the property under state law as a tax lien only 
extends to the property belonging to the wrongdoer.229  If under state law 
the ownership of embezzled funds do not pass to the embezzler, the 
government cannot levy upon property purchased with those funds.230  
Applying common law principles, the District Court found that the victims 
did not intend that the embezzler to acquire title to the property, therefore, 
the levy by the Service was null and void.231 
An important treatise on federal income tax presents the practical 
application of the priority of claims involving criminal activity notes: 
If a victim can trace and identify his property, as in the 
case of a stolen work of art, he generally can get it back, 
even if the thief has nothing left with which to pay his 
taxes.  Even if the property cannot be traced (e.g., cash 
 
 220. § 6223(h)(6); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-1(f) (as amended in 2011). 
 221. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 14.07[1][c]. 
 222. Id. at ¶ 14.04. 
 223. Id. at ¶ 14.07[1][b].  
 224. United States v. Sec. Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 113–14 (1950). See supra text 
accompanying notes 42-52 (finding by the Second Circuit, in Gilbert, that the corporation’s claim was 
subordinate to the federal tax lien because the corporation failed to file the taxpayer’s assignment of 
property). 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 14-41 (describing the Supreme Court decisions resulting in 
the inclusion in income of receipts from all types of illegal activity). 
 226. MCDANIEL, MCMAHON, SIMMONS & POLSKY, supra note 207, at 181. 
 227. Dennis v. United States, 372 F.Supp. 563 (1974). 
 228. Id. at 566–68.  
 229. Id.  
 230. Id.  
 231. Id.  See Altas, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.Supp. 1000 (1978) (holding that the tax lien of the 
government was not entitled to priority as the embezzler did not have beneficial ownership of the 
property purchased with the embezzled funds). 
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whose serial numbers are not known), the victim will 
ordinarily be familiar with the facts sooner than the 
government, and this prior knowledge will usually enable 
him to establish an enforceable claim against any assets 
that can be discovered in the criminal’s possession before 
the government’s tax lien takes hold.  Situations can be 
imagined in which the victim’s right to reimbursement will 
be subordinate to the government’s right to collect taxes on 
the unlawful income, but they are unusual, and a corrective 
for this injustice could be provided by Congress without 
going so far as to confer a blanket exemption on unlawful 
income.232 
 
F. DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES, LOSSES, AND PAYMENTS 
 
“We start with the proposition that the federal income tax is a tax on 
net income, not a sanction against wrong-doing.”233  The determination of 
the deductibility of expenses and losses incurred in an illegal activity 
begins with classification of the activity.234  If the unlawful activity 
constitutes a business, the wrongdoer may deduct all ordinary and 
necessary business expenses235 and all losses incurred in the business.236  
With regard to a nonbusiness, for-profit activity, a deduction is allowed for 
all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the production of income237 
and all losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit.  However, 
no deduction or credit is allowed for any amount paid if the business 
consists of trafficking in controlled substances prohibited by federal or 
state law.238 
 
1. Deduction of Expenses Pursuant to I.R.C. Sections 162 and 212 
 
In 1969, I.R.C. section 162, which allows a deduction for all ordinary 
and necessary business expenses, was amended to disallow deductions for 
specific categories of payments.239  The amendments were necessary to 
provide clarity as to the deductibility of such payments as illegal payments 
 
 232. Bittker, supra note 88, at 147. 
 233. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966). 
 234. See Sullivan v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) (allowing a deduction for rents and salaries 
paid in an illegal gambling enterprise as ordinary and necessary business expenses). 
 235. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2017). 
 236. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1) (West 2017). 
 237. I.R.C. § 212(1)-(2) (West 2017). In addition, Section 212 allows a deduction for the 
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income and expenses 
incurred in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax. § 212(2)-(3). 
 238. § 280E. 
 239. Tax Reform Act of 1960, Pub. L. 91-172. 
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and bribes.240  The conflict was between the requirement of taxing only net 
income and the frustration of the public policy against encouraging 
unlawful conduct.241  Pursuant to the Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine, 
a deduction is disallowed if a deduction would “frustrate sharply defined 
national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct.”242  The 
disallowance of a deduction requires a declared national or state policy and 
severe and immediate frustration of that policy.243 
By amending I.R.C. section 162, Congress preempted the existing 
case law establishing the Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine, stating 
“public policy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly 
defined to justify disallowance of deductions.”244  Certain deductions 
disallowed for specific categories of payments are also disallowed for 
payments incurred for the production of income under I.R.C. section 212.245 
 
a. I.R.C. Section 162(c)—Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks, and Other Payments 
 
Pursuant to I.R.C. 162(c)(1), no deduction is allowed for direct or 
indirect payments to any governmental official or employee, or any agency 
or instrumentality of any government, if the payment is an illegal bribe or 
kickback.246  I.R.C. section 162(c)(2) disallows a deduction for direct or 
indirect payments to any person if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe, 
illegal kickback under any federal or state law, which subjects the payor to 
a criminal penalty or the loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade or 
business.247  If a violation of state law, the deduction is only disallowed if 
 
 240. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 11.04[1], at 11-34. 
 241. Id.  Arguably, the denial of a deduction for expenditures incurred in the production of illegal 
income could be viewed as the functional equivalent of the imposition of a tax penalty.  MCDANIEL, 
MCMAHON, SIMMONS & POLSKY, supra note 207, at 399 . 
 242. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966). 
 243. Id. 
 244. S. REP. NO. 91-552 (1969) as reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 597; BITTKER, MCMAHON & 
ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 11.04[1], at 11-34.  Under I.R.C. § 162, deductions are also disallowed for 
certain lobbying and political expenditures (§ 162(e)) and treble-damage payments under the antitrust 
laws (§ 162(g)). 
 245. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(p) (as amended in 1975).  Pursuant to Section 212 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, a deduction will not be allowed if the payment is incurred for the following: (1) 
illegal bribes, kickbacks, and other payments § 162(c)); (2) fines and penalties (Section 162(f)); and 
(3) treble damage payments under the antitrust laws (Section 162(g)).  See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(p). 
 246. If an official or employee of a foreign government, a payment cannot be deducted if unlawful 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. I.R.C. § 162(c)(1) (West 2017).  The government 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the payment is an illegal bribe or kickback or 
unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.  §§ 162(c)(1), 7454; see also Treas. Reg. § 
1.162-18(a)(5) (as amended in 1975). 
 247. The government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the payment is an illegal 
bribe or kickback. I.R.C. §§ 162(c)(2), 7454; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(b)(4) (as amended in 
1975). 
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the state law is generally enforced.248  A kickback also includes a payment 
in consideration of the referral of a client, patient, or customer.249  Finally, a 
deduction is disallowed, pursuant to I.R.C. section 162(c)(3), for kickbacks, 
rebates, or bribes by physicians and other providers of goods and services 
in connection with Medicare or Medicaid, including payments for referrals 
of clients, patients, or customers. 
 
b. I.R.C. Section 162(f)—Fines and Penalties 
 
A deduction is not allowed for “any fine or similar penalty paid to a 
government for the violation of any law.”250  The disallowance occurs 
whether the violation was deliberate or inadvertent.251  The term “similar 
penalty” encompasses “payments of sanctions which are imposed under 
civil statutes but which in general terms serve the same purpose as a fine 
exacted under a criminal statute.”252  Pursuant to the Treasury Regulations, 
a fine or similar payment includes the following: (1) paid pursuant to 
conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for a crime (felony or 
misdemeanor); (2) paid as a civil penalty imposed by federal, state or local 
law, including additions to tax, additional amount, or assessable penalties 
imposed under the Internal Revenue Code; (3) paid in settlement of an 
actual or potential liability for a fine or penalty (federal or civil); or (4) 
forfeited as collateral posted in connection with a proceeding which could 
result in imposition of a fine or penalty.253  A fine or penalty does not 
include the following: (1) legal fees and related expenses made in defense 
of a prosecution or civil action arising from violation of the law; or (2) 
compensatory damages paid to a government.254 
 
2. Deduction of Losses Pursuant to I.R.C. Section 165 
 
I.R.C. section 165 allows a deduction for a loss sustained during the 
tax year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise.255  In the case of 
an individual, the deduction is limited to: (1) losses incurred in a 
business;256 (2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit;257 
 
 248. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2). 
 249. § 162(c)(2). 
 250. § 162(f). 
 251. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 11.04[2], at 11-36. 
 252. S. REP. NO. 92-437, reprinted in 1972-1 C.B. 559, 600; BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, 
supra note 6, ¶ 11.04[2], at 11-36. 
 253. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1) (as amended in 1975). 
 254. Id. at § 1.162-21(b)(2). 
 255. I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 2017).  The deduction is allowed only to the extent of the taxpayer’s 
basis in the property. § 165(b). 
 256. § 165(c)(1). 
 257. § 165(c)(2). 
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and (3) with regard to personal use property, casualty and theft losses 
sustained during the tax year.258 
In 1969, I.R.C. section 162 was amended to disallow deductions for 
specific categories of otherwise ordinary and necessary business 
expenses.259  The legislative intent was to preempt the long-established 
Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine.260  Nevertheless, the Service has long 
maintained that the Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine applies to the 
allowability of loss deductions pursuant to I.R.C. section 165.261  In 
Revenue Ruling 81-24,262 the taxpayer set fire to a building to collect 
insurance proceeds.263  After the arson was discovered, the insurance 
proceeds were not paid and the taxpayer was convicted of arson.264  On his 
tax return, the taxpayer claimed a casualty loss deduction in the amount he 
paid for the building.265  Since the taxpayer’s knowing and willful act 
caused the loss, the loss did not qualify as a casualty pursuant to I.R.C. 
section 165(c)(3).266  Further, because the taxpayer violated the applicable 
state law against committing arson and making a fraudulent insurance 
claim, a loss deduction pursuant to I.R.C. section 165(c)(1) or (c)(2) was 
disallowed on the grounds that a loss deduction would violate a sharply 
defined state declaration of public policy.267  The Service also stated that a 
deduction was not allowed pursuant to I.R.C. sections 162 and 212 as the 
taxpayer sustained a theft loss and not an ordinary and necessary expense 
incurred in a business or a for-profit activity.268 
 
3. Deduction of Legal Expenses 
 
For taxpayers engaged in criminal conduct, the ability to deduct legal 
fees is of considerable importance.  Costs incurred in defending criminal 
charges are deductible if incurred in a business or a for-profit activity, but 
 
 258. § 165(c)(3).  See infra text accompanying notes 338–60 (explaining the allowability of, and 
limitations on, deductions for the casualty and theft of personal-use property). 
 259. I.R.C. § 162(c), (f), (g) (West 2017). 
 260. See supra text accompanying notes 239-44 (discussing the Frustration of Public Policy 
Doctrine and the amendments to I.R.C. section 162 that preempted the Frustration of Public Policy 
Doctrine). 
 261. See BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 16.01, at 16-4 n..8; see also Rev. Rul. 
77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 47 (disallowing a loss deduction for the seizer of illegal coin-operated gambling 
devices as contrary to a sharply defined public policy); Mazzei v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497 (1974) 
(denying a theft loss claimed by the taxpayer because the taxpayer was defrauded while participating in 
a counterfeiting conspiracy and the allowance of the deduction would constitute an immediate and 
severe frustration of the clearly defined policy against counterfeiting U.S. currency). 
 262. Rev. Rul. 81-24, 1981-1 C.B. 79. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 7980. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
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not a personal activity.269  In deciding whether legal fees are personal, the 
Supreme Court established the origin-of-the-claim test.270  The origin and 
character of the claim with respect to legal expenses determines 
deductibility and not the potential financial consequences to the taxpayer.271 
Although a deduction for expenses incurred in an illegal activity might 
otherwise be disallowed, the disallowance does not extend to legal fees 
incurred in defense of prosecution or legal action if incurred in business or 
a for-profit activity.272  In Commissioner v. Tellier,273 the Supreme Court 
held that legal expenses incurred by a taxpayer in the unsuccessful defense 
of a criminal prosecution for securities and mail fraud were deductible as 
business expenses.274  The Supreme Court found that the criminal charges 
against the taxpayer were the result of his business activities as a security 
dealer.275  In DiFronzo v. Commissioner,276 the taxpayer was a member of a 
Chicago organized crime family, who incurred legal fees in defending 
conspiracy and mail and wire fraud charges from his involvement in an 
illegal gambling operation.277  The Tax Court allowed a business deduction 
for his legal fees because the criminal charges originated from his business 
activities as a member of an organized crime family.278  The crime family 
obtained income through a variety of illegal activities, including 
bookmaking, loan sharking, extortion, illegal gambling, trafficking in 
stolen property, and fraud.279 
 
4. Deduction of Payments in Restitution 
 
In Wilcox, the Supreme Court held that funds were not included in 
income because the embezzler did not have an unqualified right to the 
funds and had an unconditional obligation to repay.280  The Supreme Court, 
in James, overruled the Wilcox decision, holding that embezzled funds are 
 
 269. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 11.02[2][i], at 11-25.  No deduction is 
allowed for “personal, living, or family expenses.”  I.R.C. § 262(a) (West 2017). 
 270. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963).  In Gilmore, the Supreme Court held that 
attorney fees incurred by a husband successfully protecting assets from the claims of his wife in a 
divorce proceeding are nondeductible personal expenses.  Id. at 52.  See also United States v. Patrick, 
372 U.S. 53 (1963) (holding that a husband could not deduct legal expenses incurred in negotiating a 
property settlement incident to a divorce proceeding). 
 271. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49. 
 272. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-21(b)(2) (as amended in 1975); 1.212-1(p) (as amended in 1975). 
 273. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
 274. Id. at 695 (1966).  The Supreme Court found that the legal expenses were “ordinary” (not 
capital expenditures) and “necessary” (appropriate and helpful).  Id. at 689–90. 
 275. Id. at 695. 
 276. DiFronzo v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 1998-41 (1998). 
 277. Id. at 1998-41, 2. 
 278. Id. at 1998-41, 4. 
 279. Id. at 1998-41, 2. 
 280. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in 
Wilcox). 
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included in the income of the embezzler despite the legal obligation of the 
embezzler to make restitution.281  The Supreme Court noted that if the 
embezzler makes restitution to the victim, the embezzler could deduct the 
amount paid in the tax year of the repayment:282 
Just as the honest taxpayer may deduct any amount repaid in the year 
in which repayment is made, the Government points out that, “if, when, 
and to the extent that the victim recovers back the misappropriated funds, 
there is of course a reduction in the embezzler’s income.283 
The taxpayer, in Stephens v. Commissioner,284 participated in a 
scheme by employees to defraud and embezzle funds from their employer 
(Raytheon).285  The taxpayer was convicted of various federal crimes for 
which the trial judge imposed a $16,000 fine and sentenced the taxpayer to 
multiple terms of imprisonment.286  The sentencing judge suspended one of 
the prison terms, substituting five years of probation, on the condition the 
taxpayer make restitution to Raytheon in the amount of $1,000,000 
($530,000 principal and $470,000 interest).287  The taxpayer included the 
embezzled funds into income and sought to deduct the $530,000 payment 
in restitution.288  The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to a 
loss deduction, under I.R.C. section 165(c)(2),289 on the ground that 
allowance of the deduction would frustrate public policy.290 
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the loss deduction would not 
“severely and immediately frustrate sharply defined state or national public 
policy.”291  In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit considered both the 
compensatory nature and the tax consequences of the payment.292  The 
Second Circuit determined that the restitution payment was primarily 
remedial in nature to compensate Raytheon and not a fine or penalty, even 
 
 281. See supra text accompanying notes 31–38 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in 
James). 
 282. See supra text accompanying notes 31–38 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in 
James).  Forfeiture (payment to the government as a punitive measure) and restitution (repayment to the 
victim of a crime) must be distinguished because payments of forfeitures are nondeductible and 
payments of restitution may be deductible.  Brackney, supra note 161. 
 283. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961). 
 284. Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (1990).  See Robert T. Manicke, A Tax Deduction for 
Restitution Payments? Solving the Dilemma of the Thwarted Embezzler, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 593 
(1992) (arguing that a deduction should be allowed for payments of restitution in the interest of taxing 
only net income and the separation of the tax laws from the punitive functions of the government). 
 285. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 668. 
 286. Id. at 671. 
 287. Id. at 668. 
 288. Id. at 66869. 
 289. Section 165(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code allows an individual a loss deduction for 
transactions entered into for profit. 
 290. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 669.  See supra text accompanying notes 239-45 and 260-68 (discussing 
the Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine as it applies to Sections 162, 212, and 165). 
 291. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 670. 
 292. Id. at 67274. 
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though the taxpayer repaid the embezzled funds as a condition of his 
probation.293  The fact that the taxpayer’s sentence consisted of a prison 
term, fines, and an order to make restitution supported the inference that 
the restitution payment was compensatory in nature and not in the nature of 
a fine or penalty.294  In addition, if the deduction was disallowed, the 
Second Circuit reasoned that, because the he had already paid tax on the 
embezzled funds, the taxpayer would be paying tax on income that he did 
not retain.295 
I.R.C. section 1341 provides relief from the application of different 
tax rates in the computation of tax where a taxpayer included income under 
a claim of right and was allowed a deduction in a subsequent tax year 
because the taxpayer was required to repay the amount previously 
included.296  The amount included in the earlier year must have been 
included under a claim of right, meaning it appeared from all available 
facts that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the income.297  The tax 
liability for the tax year of repayment is the lesser of: (1) the tax for the tax 
year with the deduction; or (2) the tax computed without the deduction 
minus the decrease in tax liability for the earlier tax year if the amount 
repaid had not been included in income.298  The ability to utilize this 
provision is particularly important if the taxpayer is in a lower marginal 
rate of tax in the tax year of restitution.299 
To utilize I.R.C. section 1341, the taxpayer must have an apparent 
unrestricted right to the income in the tax year of inclusion.300  In Yerkie v. 
Commissioner,301 an embezzler argued that the Supreme Court, in James,302 
expanded the Claim of Right Doctrine to include embezzled funds.303  The 
Tax Court held that the taxpayer could not utilize I.R.C. section 1341 in 
computing his tax liability in the year of repayment because the embezzled 
funds were not received under a claim of right.304  Noting the underlying 
purpose of the Supreme Court in the James decision was to avoid taxing 
legal income while exempting illegal income, the Tax Court found that 
distinction between legal and illegal income is significant for 
 
 293. Id. at 67374. 
 294. Id. at 673. 
 295. Id. at 671. 
 296. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1), (2) (West 2017).  The amount of the deduction must exceed $3,000. § 
1341(a)(3). 
 297. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1996). 
 298. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4), (5). 
 299. See BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 4.03[4]. 
 300. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1). 
 301. Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 388 (1976). 
 302. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in 
James). 
 303. Yerkie, 67 T.C. at 391. 
 304. Id. 
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determinations under other sections of the Internal Revenue Code.305  The 
taxpayer misconstrued the meaning of term “unrestricted right” for the 
purposes of I.R.C. section 1341, stating: “The inclusion of embezzled funds 
as gross income and the concomitant right to a deduction upon repayment 
neither categorizes proceeds as income rightfully received nor bestows 
upon these funds the characteristics of income received under a claim of 
right.”306 
 
5. Treatment of Non-Business Deductions 
 
The distinction between criminal activity that constitutes a business 
and criminal activity that is engaged in for profit is important in the 
computation of the wrongdoer’s taxable income.  Business deductions are 
fully deductible from gross income in computing the adjusted gross income 
of an individual;307 however, most for-profit deductions are itemized 
deductions subject to limitations.308  Thus, a pivotal question is whether the 
wrongdoer’s illegal activities constitute a business. 
In Commissioner v. Groetzinger,309 the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether a full-time gambler who made wagers solely for his own 
account was engaged in business within the meaning of I.R.C. sections 
62(a)(1) and 162.310  The taxpayer devoted sixty to eighty hours per week 
to pari-mutuel wagering, primarily on dog races, with intent to earn a living 
from such activities.311  The taxpayer gambled solely for his own account 
and had no other employment.312  The Supreme Court observed that not 
every income-producing and profit-making activity constitutes a 
business.313  To be engaged in a business, the “taxpayer must be involved in 
the activity with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer’s primary 
purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit.”314 
Applying a common sense concept of business,315 the Supreme Court 
 
 305. Id. at 392. 
 306. Id. 
 307. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (West 2017). 
 308. I.R.C. § 63(d) (West 2017).  The term “itemized deduction” means all deductions except 
those deductions allowed in computing adjusted gross income under Section 62 and personal 
exemptions under Sections 151-52.  An individual may deduct a standard deduction or elect to 
itemize deductions. § 63 (b), (c). 
 309. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987). 
 310. Id. at 24.  Section 62(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code allows an individual to deduct 
business expenses, other than the business of the performing services as an employee, from gross 
income in arriving at adjusted gross income. With exceptions, Section 162 allows a deduction for 
ordinary and necessary business expenses. 
 311. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 24. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 35. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
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concluded, based on the particular facts of this case, that “if one’s gambling 
activity is pursued full-time, in good faith, and with regularity, to the 
production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere hobby, it is a trade 
or business.”316 
An example with regard to criminal activity, the courts and the 
Service agree that embezzlement does not constitute a business even 
though the embezzlements are regular and systematic.317  Thus, an 
embezzler must deduct any expense incurred for the production and 
conservation of income under I.R.C. section 212318 and any loss incurred in 
a transaction entered into for profit under I.R.C. section 165(c)(2).319  If 
restitution is made, the embezzler is allowed a deduction for restitution 
payments under I.R.C. section 165(c)(2).320  These deductions are itemized 
deduction and, as such, deducted from an individuals adjusted gross 
income in computing taxable income.321 
Deductions allowed pursuant to I.R.C. sections 212 and 165(c)(2) 
are also included in the definition of “miscellaneous itemized 
deductions.”322  Miscellaneous itemized deductions are only allowed to 
the extent total miscellaneous itemized deductions exceed two percent 
of the embezzler’s adjusted gross income for the tax year.323  If the 
embezzler’s adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount, the 
allowable itemized deductions are subject to a further limitation.324  
Thus, deductions allowed to embezzlers for for-profit expenses and 
restitution are subject to the two percent of adjusted gross income 
limitation and the overall limitation on itemized deductions.325  Finally, 
miscellaneous itemized deductions are not deductible for alternative 
minimum tax purposes326 and non-business deductions are not included 
 
 316. Id. at 35. 
 317. See Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 388, 393 (1976); see also Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 
50; Hankins v. United States, 403 F.Supp. 257, 259 (1975) (holding that embezzlement is not a business 
even though the taxpayers embezzled his employer’s funds in a regular and systemic manner). 
 318. I.R.C. § 212(1), (2) (West 2017). 
 319. § 165(c)(2). 
 320. Yerkie, 67 T.C. at 393–94; Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50. 
 321. I.R.C. § 63(a), (d) (West 2017); see also Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50. 
 322. I.R.C. § 67(b) (West 2017).  The definition of “miscellaneous itemized deduction” includes 
itemized deductions other than certain listed deductions, including deductions for interest, taxes, 
casualty and theft losses, charitable contributions, and medical expenses.  § 67(b)(1)–(5). 
 323. § 67(a). 
 324. I.R.C. § 68(a) (West 2017).  The allowable itemized deductions are further reduced by the 
lesser of: (1) three percent of the excess, or (2) 80 percent of the otherwise allowable itemized 
deductions.  Id.  
 325. See §§ 67, 68; see also Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50. 
 326. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 2017); see also I.R.C. §§ 55–57 (establishing an alternative tax, 
which is a separate system for computing income tax liability; Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50 
(holding that the repayment of misappropriated funds is deductible pursuant to Section 165(a)(2) of the 
Internal Revenue Code; therefore, a miscellaneous itemized a deduction is not allowed for the purposes 
of computing alternative minimum tax income). 
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Victims of crime do not fare much better than the perpetrators of 
crime.328  For tax purposes, the victims of thefts are generally treated 
similarly to the victims of casualty events.  Whether the taxpayer is 
engaged in a business, for-profit activity, or personal pursuit, a casualty or 
theft may result in a deductible loss.  Although counterintuitive, the 
casualty or theft of property may result in the realization and recognition of 
gain. 
 
A. LOSS FROM THEFT 
 
A theft results in the taxpayer suffering a loss of money or property.  
If a loss occurs, the question becomes whether the loss is a deductible loss 
and, if so, in which tax year is the deduction allowed. 
Generally, I.R.C. section 165 allows a loss deduction for any loss 
sustained during the tax year and not compensated by insurance or 
otherwise.329  A loss deduction is only allowed for the tax year in which the 
loss is sustained as evidenced by closed and completed transactions and as 
fixed by identifiable events.330  A theft loss is treated as sustained in the tax 
year in which the theft is discovered331 and is considered discovered when a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances would have realized the loss.332 
If a claim for reimbursement exists in the tax year of discovery, a loss 
is not sustained until determined with reasonable certainty whether or not 
reimbursement will be received.333  If a portion of the loss is covered by a 
claim for reimbursement only that portion of the loss is deductible during 
the tax year.334  For example, if a solvent embezzler promises restitution, a 
current loss deduction may be denied because the debt obligation 
constitutes a reasonable prospect of recovery.335  If the debt is subsequently 
 
 327. Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 388, 392–93 (1976); Hankins, v. United States, 403 F.Supp. 
257, 259.  See infra text accompanying notes 379-88 (detailing the computation of a net operating loss 
under I.R.C. § 172). 
 328. See supra text accompanying notes 207-32 (discussing the priority of federal tax liens over the 
claims of victims of crime for restitution). 
 329. I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 2017). 
 330. § 165(a); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.165–1(d)(1) (as amended in 1977). 
 331. I.R.C. § 165(e) (West 2017). 
 332. Cramer v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 1125, 1133 (1971). 
 333. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165–1(d)(2)(as amended in 1977), 1.165–8(a)(2) (as amended in 1964). 
Reasonable certainly maybe ascertained by the settlement, adjudication, or abandonment of a claim.  §§ 
1.165–1(d)(2)(i), 1.165–8(a)(2). 
 334. §§ 1.165–1(d)(2)(ii), 1.165–8(a)(2). 
 335. MCDANIEL, MCMAHON, SIMMONS & POLSKY, supra note 207, at 530. 
MANOLAKAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2017  3:46 PM 
66 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1 
not paid, a bad debt deduction may be allowed under I.R.C. section 166.336 
Under I.R.C. section 165(c)(1) and (2), a loss deduction for an 
individual is limited to loss incurred in a business or any transaction 
entered into for profit.337  I.R.C. section 165(c)(3) limits losses involving 
personal-use assets to losses arising from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or other 
casualty, or from theft.”338  The term “casualty” is defined as an accident, 
mishap, or sudden invasion by a hostile agency, excluding progressive 
deterioration of property through a steadily operating cause.339  Analogous 
to fire, storm, or shipwreck, a casualty requires a complete or partial 
destruction of property resulting from an identifiable event of a sudden, 
unexpected, and unusual nature.340 
As originally enacted in 1913, the predecessor to I.R.C. section 
165(c)(3) only referred only to a fire, storm, or shipwreck, but the provision 
was amended in 1916 to include loss from “other casualty, or from 
theft.”341  A theft is the unlawful taking of money or property of another, 
including, but not limited to, theft by swindle, false pretenses, larceny, 
embezzlement, and robbery.342  The Fifth Circuit, in Edwards v. 
Bromberg,343 found that “the word ‘theft’ is not like ‘larceny,’ a technical 
word of art with a narrowly defined meaning but is, on the contrary, a word 
of general and broad connotation, intended to cover any criminal 
appropriation of another’s property to the use of the taker, particularly 
including theft by swindling, false pretenses, and any other form of 
guile.”344  The Fifth Circuit also stated that courts have well established that 
whether a theft occurs, “depends upon the law of the jurisdiction where it 
was sustained and that the exact nature of the crime, whether larceny or 
embezzlement, of obtaining money under false pretenses, swindling or 
other wrongful deprivations of the property of another, is of little 
importance so long as it amounts to theft.”345 
To claim a theft loss, the victim must establish that the loss of money 
or property resulted from theft under the law of the jurisdiction where the 
loss occurred.346  In Revenue Ruling 72-112,347 the Service addressed the 
 
 336. Id.  See I.R.C. § 166 (West 2017) (allowing a deduction for any debt that becomes wholly or 
partially worthless during the tax year). Losses and bad debts are mutually exclusive.  Spring City 
Foundry v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934). 
 337. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1), (2). 
 338. § 165(c)(3). 
 339. Rev. Rul. 63–232, 1963-2 C.B. 97. 
 340. Rev. Rul. 72–592, 1972-2 C.B. 101. 
 341. 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 1, ¶ 34.3, at 34-15. 
 342. Treas. Reg. § 1.165–8(d) (as amended in 1964).  Embezzlement constitutes a theft whether or 
not connected with the taxpayer’s business or for-profit activity.  Miller v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1046 
(1953). 
 343. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 110. 
 346. Monteleone v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 688, 692 (1960).  The alleged perpetrator of the theft 
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issue of whether ransom paid to the kidnappers of a child was deductible as 
a theft loss even though the laws of the state where the kidnapping occurred 
distinguished the crimes of extortion and theft.348  The Service stated: 
“[c]onsidering the broad general meaning of theft, it must be presumed that 
Congress used the term ‘theft’ so as to cover any theft, or felonious taking 
of money or property by which a taxpayer sustains a loss, whether defined 
and punishable under the penal codes of the states as larceny, robbery, 
burglary, embezzlement, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, threats, or 
blackmail.”349  Thus, despite the fact that the ransom payments did not 
constitute “theft” under state law, the ransom paid was deductible as a theft 
loss because the taking of taxpayer’s money was illegal under the laws of 
the state where the kidnapping occurred and the taking was done with 
criminal intent.350 
Notice 2004-27 was issued to inform taxpayers that a loss deduction 
equal to the decline in market value of stock is not allowed even though the 
decline may have been caused by fraudulent accounting practices or illegal 
misconduct of corporate officers.351  To claim a theft loss, the taxpayer 
must prove that a loss resulted from a taking of property that is illegal and 
done with criminal intent.352  The taxpayer must also prove that a loss was 
sustained, and a loss is not sustained if the stock merely declines in 
value.353  In cases involving stock purchased on the open market, courts 
have consistently disallowed a theft loss for the decline in value of stock in 
circumstances in which the decline was attributable to misrepresentations 
by corporate officers who were indicted for securities fraud or other 
criminal violations.354  A loss deduction is allowed only in the tax year the 
loss is sustained as a result of the sale or exchange of the stock or the stock 
becoming completely worthless.355 
No loss deduction is allowed for the mere mysterious disappearance of 
property absent evidence of a theft.356  The taxpayer has the burden of 
presenting evidence establishing a reasonable inference that the loss was 
the result of a theft.357  For example, in Mary Frances Allen v. 
 
need not be convicted of the crime.  Vietzke v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.504, 510 (1961). 
 347. Rev. Rul. 72–112, 1972-1 C.B. 60. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 61. 
 350. Id. 
 351. I.R.S. Notice 2004-27, 2004-1 C.B. 782.  With the facts as presented, the purpose of the notice 
is to advise taxpayers that the loss deduction will be disallowed and penalties under Section 6662 of the 
Internal Revenue Code may be imposed.  Id.  
 352. Id. 
 353. Id.  The decline in value is viewed as a fluctuation in market value of the stock. 
 354. Id.  See infra text accompanying notes 510-28 (discussing the tax treatment of theft losses from 
fraudulent investment schemes that are not Ponzi schemes). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Mary Frances Allen v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 163, 166 (1951). 
 357. Id. 
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Commissioner,358 the taxpayer’s diamond brooch was lost while visiting the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York.359  The Tax Court held that the 
burden of proof was on the taxpayer to prove that the brooch was stolen.  
The taxpayer was denied a loss deduction because all she could prove was 
that the brooch disappeared and was never found or returned.  Although a 
loss deduction is not allowed for the mere mysterious disappearance of 
property, a loss deduction is allowed for property accidently and 
irretrievably lost as the result of a casualty event.360 
 
1. Loss from the Theft of Property 
 
If property is the subject of a casualty or theft, the amount of the loss 
deduction is limited to the unrecovered basis of any property involved.361  
The formula for computing the amount of the casualty or theft loss is the 
lesser of the reduction in value of the property or the basis of the 
property.362  With regard to a theft loss, the value of the property after the 
theft is considered zero.363 
If an individual incurs a casualty or theft of property in a business or 
for-profit activity, the amount of the loss deduction is only subject to the 
basis limitation.364  With regard to personal-use property, the amount of 
deductible casualty and theft loss is subject to the basis limitation and two 
additional limitations.365  First, a loss deduction is allowed only to the 
extent the amount of the loss from each casualty or theft exceeds $100.366  
Second, the amount of the casualty or theft loss is limited to the sum of 
personal casualty gain, plus the amount of any excess personal casualty 
loss that exceeds ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.367 
 
 358. Id. at 163. 
 359. Id. at 16364. 
 360. White v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 430, 438 (1967); Rev. Rul. 72–592, 19722 C.B. 101. 
 361. I.R.C. § 165(b) (West 2017); Treas. Reg. § 1.165–1(c)(1) (as amended in 1977). 
 362. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165–7(b)(1) (as amended in 1977), 1.165–8(c) (as amended in 1964).  
However, if property that is used in a business or transaction entered into for profit is totally destroyed, 
and the basis of the property is greater than the value immediately before the casualty or theft, the 
amount of the loss is the basis of the property.  §§ 1.165–7(b)(1), 1.165–8(c).  Two methods can be 
employed to determine the reduction in value of property: (1) the appraised value of the property 
immediately before and immediately after the event; or (2) the cost of repairs to the property.  § 1.165–
7(a)(2). 
 363. Treas. Reg. § 1.165–8(c) (as amended in 1964).  
 364. I.R.C. § 165(b).  See Rev. Rul. 87–59, 1987-2 C.B. 59 (holding that a business loss deduction 
is allowed even though the casualty event lacked the requisite suddenness to qualify as a casualty). 
 365. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), (h). 
 366. §165(h)(1) (West 2017); Treas. Reg. § 1.165–7(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 1977). The $100 
limitation applies separately to each individual who sustains a loss if the damaged or destroyed property 
is owned by two or more individuals.  § 1.165–7(b)(4)(iii). 
 367. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B).  The terms “personal casualty losses” and “personal casualty gains” are 
defined as losses and gains arising from the casualty or theft of personal-use property.  § 165(h)(4).  If 
the taxpayer’s personal-use property is insured, a casualty or theft loss deduction is only allowed if the 
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Example: Taxpayer enjoys collecting art for personal enjoyment.  
Taxpayer’s adjusted gross income is $100,000.  During the tax year, a 
sculpture was stolen from Taxpayer’s home.  The sculpture was 
purchased for $20,000 and had a value of $25,000.  The sculpture was 
uninsured and never recovered.  During the same burglary, a painting 
was also stolen.  The painting was purchased for $10,000 and had a 
value of $20,000, and Taxpayer received $15,000 in insurance 
proceeds. As a result of the burglary, Taxpayer experienced a personal 
casualty loss with regard to the sculpture of $19,900 (lesser of 
reduction in value of $25,000 ($25,000 minus zero) or $20,000 
($20,000 basis) minus the $100 floor) and a personal casualty gain of 
$5,000 ($15,000 insurance proceeds minus $10,000 basis).  Thus, 
pursuant to I.R.C. section 165(h), Taxpayer’s allowable personal 
casualty loss deduction is $9,900 ($5,000 to the extent of the personal 
casualty gain plus $4,900 ($14,900 minus $10,000 ($100,000 adjusted 
gross income x 10%)).  
 
2. Tax Benefit Rule 
 
As a taxpayer’s tax liability is based on the facts occurring within the 
tax year, the good faith deduction of payments or losses that are recovered 
in a subsequent tax year results in the inclusion into income of the amount 
recovered under the Tax Benefit Rule.368  Thus, if a victim of theft properly 
claims a loss deduction or a bad debt deduction and subsequently recovers 
all or a portion of the amount deducted, the taxpayer must include in 
income the amount recovered in the subsequent tax year.369  The amount 
included is subject to I.R.C. section 111 that requires the earlier deduction 
produced a tax benefit for the taxpayer.370 
In Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States,371 the taxpayer 
claimed a deduction for the value of parcels of real property donated to a 
charity in 1939 and 1940.372  In 1957, the charity reconveyed the parcels to 
the taxpayer.373  Pursuant to the Tax Benefit Rule, the taxpayer was 
required to include in gross income the amount of the deductions taken in 
 
taxpayer files a timely insurance claim.  § 165(h)(5)(E). 
 368. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 3.07[1], at 3-2223 (Warren Gorham & 
Lamont 3d ed. 2002).  The Supreme Court has held that “a fundamentally inconsistent event,” and not 
just an actual recovery, is necessary for the application of the Tax Benefit Rule. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. 
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983). 
 369. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165–1(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1977), 1.166–1(f) (as amended in 1986). 
 370. I.R.C. § 111(a) (West 2017). 
 371. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (1967). 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. at 400. 
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the prior tax years.374  In 1939 and 1940, the taxpayer’s tax rates were 
eighteen and twenty-four percent, respectively, with the result that the 
deductions produced a combined tax savings of $1,877.49.375  The 
taxpayer’s tax rate in 1957 was fifty-two percent with the result that the 
inclusion produced a tax cost of $4,527.60.376  The taxpayer argued that the 
increase in tax liability for 1957 should be limited to the original tax benefit 
of $1,877.49.377  The U.S. Court of Claims held: 
Since the taxpayer in this case did obtain full tax benefit 
from its earlier deductions, those deductions were properly 
classified as income upon recoupment and must be taxed 
as such.  This can mean nothing less than the application of 
that rate which is in effect during the year in which the 
recovered item is recognized as a factor of income.378 
 
3. Net Operating Loss 
 
Congress enacted I.R.C. section 172 to ameliorate the effect of the 
annual accounting period that requires a taxpayer’s taxable income to be 
computed on the basis of the taxpayer’s tax year.379  The primary purpose 
of this provision is to treat businesses with fluctuating income in the same 
manner as businesses with a steady flow of income by allowing a net 
operating loss to be carried back and then carried forward.380  The result is a 
type of income averaging for the taxpayer experiencing business losses in 
some years and business profits in other years.381  Generally, a net 
operating loss (NOL) can be carried back and deducted against taxable 
income in the two tax years prior to the loss year.382  Then, the NOL is 
carried forward and deducted against taxable income for up to twenty tax 
years subsequent to the loss year.383 
 
 374. Id. at 402. 
 375. Id. at 400. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 403.  See supra text accompanying notes 296-306 (discussing the Claim of Right 
Doctrine and I.R.C. Section 1341 that mitigates the difference in tax rate between the tax year of 
inclusion and the tax year of deduction). 
 379. I.R.C. § 441(a); BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 19.02[1], at 19-6. 
I.R.C. § 441(a) (West 2017); BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, ¶ 19.02[1] (Warren Gorham & Lamont 3d ed. 2002). 
 380. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 19.02[1], at 19-6. 
 381. Id. 
 382. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (West 2017).  
 383. § 172(b)(1)(A).  The entire net operating loss deduction must be carried first to the earliest 
permissible year, and the remaining net operating loss deduction is then carried forward to each year in 
a chronological order until the net operating loss is fully absorbed.  § 172(b)(2).  If a taxpayer carries a 
net operating loss deduction to an earlier year, the deduction will require a recomputation of the tax 
liability for the earlier year, resulting in a refund or credit of any excess tax paid.  Treas. Reg. § 1.172–
1(d) (as amended in 1986). 
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In order to take advantage of I.R.C. section 172, an individual must be 
engaged in a business and the expenses incurred must relate to that 
business.384  Generally, the NOL is the excess of business deductions over 
the taxpayer’s gross income, subject to the following modifications: (1) 
personal and dependency exemptions are disallowed; (2) nonbusiness 
deductions are allowed only to the extent of nonbusiness income; (3) 
capital losses in excess of capital gains are not deductible; and (4) no 
exclusion of gain from the sale or exchange of qualified small business 
stock under I.R.C. section 1202.385 
Losses from casualties and thefts incurred by an individual in a 
transaction entered into for profit or with regard to personal-use property 
are treated as attributable to a business.386  With regard to personal-use 
property, only losses allowable under I.R.C. section 165(c)(3), subject to 
the I.R.C. section 165(h) limitations, are treated as business losses in 
computing the NOL.387  In the case of an individual, the portion of the NOL 
attributable to a casualty or theft loss can be carried back three tax years.388  
Thus, greater tax relief is provided non-business casualty and theft losses 
by the extension of the carryback period, thereby, increasing the number of 
tax years over which the NOL can be absorbed. 
 
B. GAIN FROM THE THEFT OF PROPERTY 
 
Counterintuitively, a casualty or theft may result in taxable gain if the 
property involved is adequately insured.389  Unless otherwise provided, gain 
or loss realized on the disposition of property is recognized for tax 
purposes.390  I.R.C. section 1033 provides for the nonrecognition of gain 
realized on the involuntary conversion of property.391  The purpose of the 
section is to relieve a taxpayer from unanticipated tax liability arising from 
 
 384. For purposes of the net operating loss deduction, employment constitutes a business.  Lagreide 
v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 508, 513 (1954). 
 385. I.R.C. § 172(c)–(d); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.172–3(a) (as amended in 1986); I.R.C. § 1202 
(West 2017) (allowing an exclusion from income for fifty percent of the gain on the sale of qualified 
small business stock held for more than five years). 
 386. § 172(d)(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.172–3(a)(3)(iii). 
 387. I.R.C. § 172(d)(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.172–3(a)(3)(iii).  See supra text accompanying notes 
338–60 (discussing the meaning of the phrase “arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, and other casualty, or 
from theft” for the purposes of I.R.C. 165(c)(3)).  See supra text accompanying notes 365-67 (detailing 
the limitations applicable to personal casualty loss deductions under I.R.C. section 165(h)). 
 388. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(E)(i), (ii)(I). 
 389. Gain is amount by which the proceeds on the disposition of the property exceed the cost of the 
property.  I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a) (West 2017).  Loss is the amount by which the cost of the 
property exceeds the proceeds on the disposition of the property.  § 1001(a).  A loss represents the 
unrecovered cost of the property.  § 1001(a).  The “cost” of property is the basis of the property with 
adjustments. I.R.C. §§ 1011(a), 1016 (West 2017). 
 390. § 1001(c). 
 391. I.R.C. § 1033(a) (West 2017).  Section 1033 does not apply to losses. Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)–
1(a) (as amended in 1981). 
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the involuntary conversion of property to the extent the taxpayer reinvests 
the proceeds within the period required by statute without changing the 
nature of the investment.392 
At the election of the taxpayer, gain realized on an involuntary 
conversion of property is not recognized if the money received by the 
taxpayer is reinvested in property similar or related in service or use to the 
converted property.393  However, gain is recognized to the extent the money 
received on the conversion exceeds the cost of the replacement property.394  
I.R.C. section 1033 may be elected whether the converted property is used 
in a business, held for the production of income, or personal-use 
property.395  Generally, the replacement period begins on the date of the 
conversion and ends two years after the close of the first tax year in which 
any part of the gain is realized.396 The basis of the replacement property is 
the amount paid for the property reduced by any unrecognized gain.397 
 
Example: Taxpayer’s classic automobile was stolen.  The automobile had 
a cost of $100,000.  Within six months of the theft, Taxpayer received 
insurance proceeds of $150,000.  Taxpayer immediately acquires a 
replacement classic automobile at a cost of $200,000.  The 
replacement automobile qualifies as similar or related in service or use 
to the stolen automobile.  As a result of the theft, Taxpayer realized 
$50,000 gain ($150,000 insurance proceeds minus $100,000 basis) but 
recognizes $0 gain because all of the insurance proceeds were 
reinvested.  The basis of the replacement automobile is $150,000 
($200,000 cost of the replacement automobile minus $50,000 
unrecognized gain).  If Taxpayer acquired a replacement classic 
automobile at a cost of $125,000, Taxpayer realized $50,000 gain 
($150,000 insurance proceeds minus $100,000 basis) and recognizes 
$25,000 gain ($150,000 insurance proceeds minus $125,000 cost of 
the replacement automobile).  The basis of the replacement 
automobile is $100,000 ($125,000 cost of the replacement automobile 
minus $25,000 unrecognized gain). 
 
 392. Willamette Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 126, 131 (2002). 
 393. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A).  Section 1033 is mandatory if property is converted directly into 
property similar or related in service or use. § 1033(a)(1).  Generally, the replacement property cannot 
be acquired from a related person if the gain realized on the involuntary conversion exceeds $100,000.  
§ 1033(i). 
 394. 1033(a)(2)(A). 
 395. J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 966 (LexisNexis 
10th ed. 2012). 
 396. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)–2(c)(2) (as amended in 1981) 
(providing detailed rules for the time and manner of making the election). 
 397. I.R.C. § 1033(b)(2); see also § 1223(1) (West 2017) (tacking the holding period of the 
converted property onto the holding period of the replacement property for purpose of characterizing 
gain or loss). 
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For I.R.C. section 1033 to apply, the compulsory or involuntary 
conversion of property must be the result of “destruction in whole or in 
part, theft, seizure, or requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence 
thereof.”398  Within the meaning of I.R.C. section 1033, an involuntary 
conversion requires that the taxpayer’s property is no longer useful or 
available to the taxpayer due to some outside force or agency.399  The term 
“destruction” is equivalent to “casualty” in the sense of I.R.C. section 
165(c)(3), only allowing a loss deduction with respect to personal-use 
property if the loss arises from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty or 
from theft.”400  In addition to casualty events, I.R.C. section 1033 
specifically applies to the theft of property.401  For the purposes of I.R.C. 
section 1033, the term “theft” is “a word of general and broad connotation 
intended to cover and covering any criminal appropriation of another’s 
property to the use of the taker, particularly including theft by swindling, 
false pretenses, and any other form of guile.”402 
To assure the continuation of investment, I.R.C. section 1033 requires 
that the converted property and replacement property be “similar or related 
in service or use.”403  Although the similar-or-related-in-service-or-use 
standard is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code or the Treasury 
Regulations, two tests have been established: (1) the functional test, and (2) 
the investor test.404  The functional test looks at the functional similarities 
between the properties, requiring the physical characteristics and end uses 
of the converted and replacement properties to be closely similar.405  The 
investor test focuses on the extent and type of the lessor’s management 
activity, the amount and kind of services rendered by the lessor to the 
tenants, and the nature of the business risks associated with the 
 
 398. § 1033(a). 
 399. C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 468, 476 (1964), aff’d, 342 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 
1965); Willamette, 118 T.C. at 132. 
 400. Rev. Rul. 59–102, 1959–1 C.B. 200, 201.  See supra text accompanying notes 338-60 
(discussing the meaning of the phrase “arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, and other casualty, or from 
theft” for the purposes of Section 165(c)(3)).  For purposes of Section 1033, as long as the cause of the 
destruction falls within the general concept of a casualty, the taxpayer does not have to satisfy the 
requirement of “suddenness” that must be satisfied to qualify for a casualty loss deduction under 
Section 165(c)(3).  Rev. Rul. 59–102, 1959–1 C.B. 200. 
 401. I.R.C. § 1033(a). 
 402. Hope v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1020, 1033–1034 (1961), aff’d, 471 F.2d 738 (3rd Cir. 1973) 
(citing Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956)); see also Rev. Rul. 66–355, 1966–2 
C.B. 302 (holding the unauthorized pledging of the taxpayer’s stock as collateral for the personal loan 
by a financial manager constituted a theft for the purposes of I.R.C. Section 1033). 
 403. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1). 
 404.  Liant Record, Inc. v. Commissioner, 303 F. 2d 326 (2d Cir. 1962); see also Rev. Rul. 64–237, 
1964–2 C.B. 319.  A taxpayer replacing rental property with property owned and occupied by the 
taxpayer does not satisfy the similar-or-related-in-service-or-use standard.  Rev. Rul. 79–261, 1979–2 
C.B. 295, 296. 
 405. Rev. Rul. 76–319, 1976–2 C.B. 242. 
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properties.406  For example, a taxpayer, who owns and operates a light 
manufacturing plant on the converted property and then owns and operates 
a wholesale grocery warehouse on the replacement property, does not 
satisfy the functional test.407  However, a taxpayer who owns and leases a 
light manufacturing plant on the converted property and then owns and 
leases a wholesale grocery warehouse on the replacement property, 
satisfies the investor test.408 
 
C. CHARACTERIZATION OF THEFT GAIN AND LOSS 
 
The characterization of theft gain and loss is complex but essential to 
the victims of crime.  If a theft gain is characterized as ordinary gain, the 
gain is taxed at ordinary tax rates that range from 10 percent to 39.6 
percent.409  However, if a theft gain is characterized as capital gain, the gain 
is taxed at preferential rates of 15 percent or 20 percent.410  With regard to a 
theft loss, ordinary loss is deductible against ordinary income,411 while a 
capital loss may be restricted as to the tax year of deductibility.412 
Although the statutory treatment of capital gains varied over the 
decades, the current preferential treatment for individual taxpayers is found 
in I.R.C. section 1(h), which provides an alternative tax formula in 
determining tax liability.413  Depending on the type of asset that generated 
the gain, generally, long term capital gain is subject to three maximum 
rates of tax:414  (1) 28 percent for collectible gain415 and section 1202 
gain;416 (2) 25 percent for unrecaptured section 1250 gain;417 and (3) 15 
 
 406. Liant Record, 303 F.2d at 329; see also Rev. Rul. 64–237, 1964–2 C.B. 319. 
 407. Rev. Rul. 64–237, 1964–2 C.B. 319. 
 408. Id. 
 409. I.R.C. § 1 (a)-(d), (i) (West 2017). 
 410. § 1(h).  Currently, preferential tax treatment for capital gains is not available to corporate 
taxpayers.   I.R.C. §§ 11, 1201(a) (West 2012). 
 411. I.R.C. §§ 62, 63 (West 2017). 
 412. I.R.C. §§ 1211, 1212 (West 2017). 
 413. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 31.01, at 31-3.  For I.R.C. § 1(h) to apply, 
the taxpayer’s activities for the tax year must generate net capital gain. I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 2017).  The 
term “net capital gain” means the excess of net long term capital gain (long term capital gains minus 
long term capital losses) minus net short term capital loss (short term capital losses minus short term 
capital gains). I.R.C § 1222(11) (West 2017).  Capital gains and losses are long term if the asset was 
held for more than one year and short term if the asset was held for not more than one year.  § 1222(1)–
(4) (West 2017).  To determine the holding period of property, the day of acquisition is excluded and 
the day of disposition is included.  Rev. Rul. 66–7, 1966–1 C.B. 188; see also I.R.C. § 1223(1) (West 
2017) (tacking the holding period of the converted property onto the holding period of the property 
acquired for the purpose of characterizing gain or loss). 
 414. I.R.C. § 1(h). 
 415. I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(F)(4)-(5), 408(m)(2) (West 2017).  A “collectible” is defined to include any 
work of art, rug or antique, metal or gem, stamp or coin, alcoholic beverage, or any other property 
specified by the Secretary of the Treasury.  § 408(m)(2). 
 416. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(F)(4), (7).  The term “section 1202 gain” means the gain on the sale of 
qualified small business stock in excess of the amount of gain excluded from gross income under 
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percent for adjusted net capital gain.418  Adjusted net capital gain is residual 
long term capital gain plus qualified dividend income.419  For the high-
income taxpayers who are subject to the 39.6 percent tax rate, the tax rate 
on adjusted net capital gain increases to 20 percent.420  Capital gains may 
also be subject to the 3.8 percent tax on net investment income under I.R.C. 
section 1411.421 
Contrary to the preferential tax treatment for capital gains, capital loss 
is generally only deductible to the extent of capital gain.422  For individual 
taxpayers, I.R.C. section 1211(b) limits the deduction of capital loss to the 
amount of capital gain with any capital loss in excess of capital gain 
deductible against ordinary income up to maximum of $3,000.423  Any 
capital loss remaining is carried forward for into succeeding tax years, 
retaining its original character as either long term capital loss or short term 
capital loss.424  The capital loss carryover is subject to the same limitations 
in the succeeding tax years until fully utilized.425 
The general rule is that capital gain or loss is generated by the sale or 
exchange of a capital asset.426  Unless character is statutorily provided, 
capital gain and loss only result from dispositions that qualify as a sale or 
exchange and property that qualifies as a capital asset.427  In addition to the 
dispositions that are generally considered a sale or exchange, case law has 
 
Section 1202. § 1(h)(7). 
 417. § 1(h)(1)(E), (h)(6) (West 2017).  The term “unrecaptured section 1250 gain” means the gain 
on the sale of depreciable real property attributable to depreciation deductions taken during the holding 
period of the property.  § 1(h)(6)(A)(i). 
 418. § 1(h)(1)(D), (h)(3).  To the extent adjusted net capital gain would have been taxed at 10% or 
15%, the preferential rate of tax is zero.  § 1(h)(1)(B). 
 419. § 1(h)(3).  The term “adjusted net capital gain” means the long-term capital gain other than 
collectible gain, Section 1202 gain, and unrecaptured Section 1250 gain, plus qualified dividend 
income.  § 1(h)(3).  Generally, qualified dividends are dividends distributed by U.S. corporations and 
certain foreign corporations.  § 1(h)(11)(B). 
 420. § 1(h)(1), (C), (D) (West 2017). The 39.6% bracket applies to individuals with taxable income 
above the following amounts: $450,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns; $425,000 for heads of 
households; $400,000 for single taxpayers; and $225,000 for married taxpayers filing separately.  § 
1(i)(3).  The threshold amounts are adjusted for inflation.  § 1(i)(3)(C). 
 421. I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1), (c)(1) (West 2017).  The net investment income tax is 3.8 percent of the 
lesser of: (1) net investment income, or (2) modified adjusted gross income, over the threshold amount.  
§ 1411(a)(1).  Net investment income includes interest, dividends, royalties, and rents if not derived in 
the ordinary course of business and net gain attributable to the disposition of property if the property is 
not held in the ordinary course of business.  § 1411(c). 
 422. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1211, 1212 (West 2017). 
 423. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1211(b). 
 424. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1212(b). 
 425. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1211(b), 1212(b).  The unused capital loss carryovers expire with the death of 
the taxpayer who sustained the losses.  BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 31.02[4], at 
31-18.  For corporation taxpayers, I.R.C. section 1211(a) limits the deduction of capital losses to the 
amount of capital gains, with any unused capital losses carried back for three years and then carried 
forward for five years as short term capital loss.  I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1211(a), 1212(a). 
 426. I.R.C. § 1222(1)–(4) (West 2017). 
 427. § 1222(1)–(4). 
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determined whether other types of dispositions also satisfy the sale or 
exchange requirement.428  In Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather 
Co.,429 the Supreme Court held that the receipt of insurance proceeds as 
compensation for the destruction by fire of a business plant did not 
constitute a sale or exchange of property.430  Presumably, this result would 
“also encompass losses from tortious or criminal conduct (e.g., negligence, 
theft, or embezzlement).”431  Nevertheless, the sale or exchange 
requirement is often provided by statute.432  For example, a loss resulting 
from the worthlessness of stock or securities is deemed a loss from the sale 
or exchange of a capital asset.433 
I.R.C. section 1221 defines a “capital asset” as property held by the 
taxpayer whether or not connected with the taxpayer’s business.434  
However, the definition of a capital asset contains eight broadly interpreted 
exceptions, including:435  (1) inventory and property held primarily for sale 
to customers in the ordinary course of business; (2) depreciable property 
and real property used in business; and (3) copyright, literary, musical, or 
artistic composition, a letter, memorandum or similar property created by 
the taxpayer.436  If property is held by the taxpayer as inventory437 or 
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s 
business,438 the disposition of the property always produces ordinary 
income and ordinary loss.439  Self-created works of the taxpayer, such as a 
copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or a letter or 
 
 428. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 32.01[1], at 32–3. 
 429. Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 248–49 (1941). 
 430. Id. at 248–49, 251. 
 431. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 32.01[2], at 32–5. 
 432. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 32.01[1], at 32–4. 
 433. I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) (West 2017). The term “security” means: (1) stock of a corporation; (2) a 
right to subscribe for, or to receive, corporate stock; and (3) a bond, debenture, note, or certificate, 
or other evidence of indebtedness issued by a corporation or by a government, with interest coupons 
or in registered form.0 § 165(g)(2). 
 434. I.R.C. § 1221(a) (West 2017). 
 435. § 1221(a). Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960). 
 436. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1)–(3).  The exceptions also include: (1) accounts or notes received for the 
sale of inventory and performance of services; (2) publications of the U.S. government acquired other 
than by purchase; (3) commodities derivative financial instruments held by a dealer; (4) clearly 
identified hedging transactions; and (5) supplies regularly consumed in the ordinary course of business.  
§ 1221(a)(4)–(8). 
 437. §§ 1221(a)(1), 1221(b)(1)(A).  Inventory accounting must be used whenever “production, 
purchase, or sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.471–1 (1960). 
 438. I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), 1231(b)(1)(B).  In determining whether the taxpayer holds the property 
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, the factors weighed by the court 
include: the frequency and substantiality of the sales; extent of development activities and 
improvements; and solicitation and advertising efforts.  Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d. 
171, 176 (5th Cir. 1980).  With regard to property held for multiple purposes, the Supreme Court 
defined “primarily” to mean “principally” or “of first importance.”  Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 
(1966). 
 439. I.R.C. §§ 1221 (a)(1), 1231(b)(1)(A), (B) (West 2017). 
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memorandum, also produce ordinary gain and loss.440 
With regard to depreciable business property and real property used in 
the taxpayer’s business excluded from the definition of capital asset,441 
I.R.C. section 1231 will determine the character of gain and loss if the 
property is sold or exchanged and held for more than one year.442  
Additionally, I.R.C. section 1231 will determine the character of gains and 
losses from the compulsory or involuntary conversion of property used in 
the taxpayer’s business and nonpersonal-use capital assets held for more 
than one year.443  Generally, if the taxpayer’s aggregate gains exceed 
aggregate losses, the gains and losses are characterized as long term capital 
gains and losses.444  However, if the aggregate gains do not exceed the 
aggregate losses, the gains and losses are ordinary.445 
I.R.C. section 1231 affords special treatment to gain and loss arising 
from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty or from theft of property used 
in the taxpayer’s business and nonpersonal-use capital assets held for more 
than one year.446  If the aggregate losses exceed the aggregate gains from 
such events, the losses and gains are ordinary.447  However, if the aggregate 
losses do not exceed the aggregate gains, the character of the casualty and 
theft gains and losses is determined along with the other gains and losses 
characterized under I.R.C. section 1231.448 
 
Example: Construction equipment used in Taxpayer’s business was stolen 
and not recovered.  The equipment was insured.  Taxpayer incurred a 
$50,000 loss from the theft of a bulldozer and a $25,000 gain from the 
theft of an excavator.  In an unrelated transaction, Taxpayer 
 
 440. §§ 1221(a)(3)(A), 1231(b)(1)(C).  Property received with a transferred basis from the creator 
also falls within the exception, for example, property received by gift.  I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(3)(C), 1015(a) 
(West 2017).  At the election of the taxpayer, the sale or exchange of musical compositions or 
copyrights in musical works will not be treated as a noncapital asset.  I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3). 
 441. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(2). 
 442. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(3).  Depreciable property or real property used in the taxpayer’s 
business held for more than one year is termed “property used in the trade or business.”  § 
1231(b)(1).  “Property used in the trade or business” does not include: (1) inventory; (2) property 
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business; (3) copyright, literary, 
musical, or artistic composition, a letter, memorandum or similar property created by the taxpayer; 
and (4) publications of the U.S. government acquired other than by purchase.  § 1231(b)(1)(A)–(D). 
 443. § 1231(a)(3), (4)(C).  See supra text accompanying notes 398-402 (defining the types of events 
that constitute a compulsory or involuntary conversion as the result of destruction, theft, or seizure, or 
an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof). 
 444. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1); see also § 1231(c) (providing recapture rules to prevent the manipulation 
of the netting rules in order to maximize capital gains and ordinary losses). 
 445. § 1231(a)(2). 
 446. § 1231(a)(4)(C).  See supra text accompanying notes 338-60 (discussing the meaning of the 
phrase “arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, and other casualty, or from theft” for the purposes of I.R.C. 
165(c)(3)). 
 447. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(4)(C). 
 448. § 1231(a)(3), (4)(C). 
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experienced a $100,000 gain from the sale of a warehouse.  All of the 
property was depreciable property or real property used in Taxpayer’s 
business and all were held for more than one year.  Since the theft loss 
of $50,000 exceeds the theft gain of $25,000, the loss and gain are 
ordinary.  The $100,000 gain from the sale of the warehouse is long 
term capital gain.  However, if the gain from the theft of the excavator 
was $75,000, the casualty gain exceeds the casualty loss of $50,000, 
and, therefore, the gain and loss are weighted with the gain of 
$100,000 from the sale of the warehouse.  As the aggregate gain of 
$175,000 ($75,000 excavator plus $100,000 warehouse) exceeds the 
$50,000 loss (bulldozer), the gains are long term capital gain and the 
loss is a long term capital loss. 
 
With regard to personal-use property, I.R.C. section 165 allows an 
individual a loss deduction only if the loss arises from fire, storm, 
shipwreck, or other casualty or from theft.449  Pursuant to I.R.C. section 
165(h), however, the amount of the personal casualty losses are allowed 
only to the extent that: (1) the personal casualty losses exceed $100 per 
event, and (2) if the aggregate personal casualty losses exceed the 
aggregate personal casualty gains, the net personal casualty loss exceeds 
ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.450  In addition to 
limiting the amount of deductible personal casualty losses, I.R.C. section 
165(h) also determines the character of personal casualty gain and personal 
casualty loss.451  If the aggregate personal casualty loss exceeds the 
aggregate personal casualty gain, the losses and gains are ordinary. 452  If 
the aggregate personal casualty gain exceeds the aggregate personal 
casualty loss, all of the personal casualty losses are deductible and the gains 
and losses are deemed to be gains and losses from the sale or exchange of 
capital assets.453 
I R.C. section 166 provides for a deduction for partially or wholly 
worthless bad debts.454  The section applies to all bona fide debts whether 
the origin of the obligation is the taxpayer’s business or a for-profit or 
personal transaction.455  A bona fide debt is an obligation arising “from a 
 
 449. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (West 2017).  See supra text accompanying notes 338-60 (discussing the 
meaning of the phrase “arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, and other casualty, or from theft” for the 
purposes of I.R.C. 165(c)(3)). 
 450. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A). 
 451. § 165(h)(2). 
 452. See Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 250–251 (1941) (holding 
that a casualty event is not a sale or exchange of property). 
 453. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B). See supra text accompanying notes 364-67 (providing an example of the 
application of I.R.C. section 165(h)). 
 454. I.R.C. § 166(a) (West 2017).  The amount of the bad debt deduction is limited to the basis of 
the obligation.  § 166(b). 
 455. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 17.01, at 17-2. 
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debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid and enforceable obligation 
to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money.456  The worthlessness of a 
debt is determined considering all pertinent evidence, including the value 
of any collateral, if any, and the financial condition of the creditor.457  As to 
the tax treatment of a bad debt deduction, a business bad debt is an ordinary 
deduction, while a nonbusiness bad debt is short term capital loss.458 
In Revenue Ruling 77-383,459 the taxpayer had a personal savings 
account at a bank.460  An employee of the bank embezzled large sums of 
money from the bank, resulting in the bank becoming insolvent.461  The 
Service found that the bank’s money, not the taxpayer’s money, was 
embezzled and that the taxpayer’s loss only arose as an indirect result of 
the embezzlement.462  The debtor-creditor relationship existed between the 
taxpayer and the bank and not the taxpayer and the bank’s employee.463  
The Service held that the loss sustained by the taxpayer was a nonbusiness 
bad debt under I.R.C. section 166 and not a theft loss deductible under to 
I.R.C. section 165.464  Thus, the deduction was a short term capital loss and 
not an ordinary loss deduction.465 
 
D. TREATMENT OF THEFT LOSS AND GAIN IN THE COMPUTATION OF 
TAXABLE INCOME 
 
In computing taxable income, a theft gain or loss may be treated very 
differently for tax purposes depending on the circumstances that generated 
the gain or loss.  Income included in the victim’s income pursuant to the 
Tax Benefit Rule is ordinary income taxed at regular tax rates.466  A gain 
from theft of property is included in the victim’s income unless excluded 
 
 456. Treas. Reg. § 1.166–1(c) (as amended in 1986).  Proof of bona fide debt requires an 
affirmative showing of the existence, at the time of the transaction, of a real expectation of 
repayment and intent to enforce the collection of the indebtedness.  Van Anda’s Estate v. 
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1158, 1162 (1949), aff’d per curiam, 192 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 457. Treas. Reg. § 1.166–2(a) (as amended in 1993).  Nevertheless, if the surrounding 
circumstances indicate that a debt is worthless and uncollectible, legal action to enforce payment is not 
necessary.  § 1.166–2(b). 
 458. I.R.C. § 166(a), (d)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.166–5(as amended in 1980).  The term “nonbusiness 
debt” is defined as a debt other than: (1) a debt created or acquired in connection with the business 
of the taxpayer; and (2) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer’s 
business.  I.R.C. § 166(d)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.166–5(b). 
 459. Rev. Rul. 77–383, 1977–2 C.B. 66. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id. at 67. 
 463. Id. 
 464. Id. 
 465. I.R.C. § 166(d) (West 2017). 
 466. See supra text accompanying notes 368-78 (discussing the inclusion and exclusion of income 
pursuant to the Tax Benefit Rule).  See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8 (1952) (allowing an 
examination of a prior tax year for the purpose of characterization). 
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pursuant to the nonrecognition provision I.R.C. section 1033.467  Ordinarily, 
theft gain or loss generates ordinary income or an ordinary deduction 
because a theft does not satisfy the sale or exchange requirement for capital 
treatment; however, the sale or exchange requirement may be satisfied 
statutorily.468  Includable theft gain may be characterized as long-term 
capital gain taxable at preferential tax rates, and a theft loss may be 
characterized as capital loss subject to the limitations provided in I.R.C. 
sections 1211 and 1212.469  Non-business bad debts are treated as short 
term capital loss and subject to such limitations applicable to capital 
losses.470 
For an individual, I.R.C. section 62 identifies which allowable 
deductions are deductible from gross income in computing adjusted gross 
income.  A theft loss and bad debt deduction incurred in the victim’s 
business are taken into account in computing the victim’s adjusted gross 
income.471  Also deductible from gross income in computing adjusted gross 
income are theft losses characterized as capital losses and deductions 
attributable to rents.472  Further, personal casualty losses to the extent of 
personal casualty gains are deductible from gross income in computing 
adjusted gross income.473 
A theft loss generated by a for-profit activity and net personal casualty 
loss are itemized deductions that reduce adjusted gross income in the 
computation of taxable income.474  Fortunately, theft loss produced by a 
for-profit activity and net personal casualty loss are not miscellaneous 
itemized deductions, subject to the two percent of adjusted gross income 
floor.475  Further, casualty and theft losses incurred in for-profit activities 
and personal casualty losses are not subject to the overall limitation on 
itemized deductions.476  If a taxpayer elects the standard deduction instead 
 
 467. See supra text accompanying notes 389-408 (explaining the application of I.R.C. section 1033, 
allowing for the nonrecognition of realized gain as a result of the involuntary conversion of property). 
 468. See supra text accompanying notes 426-33 (discussing the characterization and treatment of 
gains and losses). 
 469. See supra text accompanying notes 409-25 (discussing the characterization and treatment 
of gains and losses). 
 470. I.R.C. § 166(d).  See supra text accompanying notes 454-65 (discussing the characterization of 
bad debt deductions). See supra text accompanying notes 422-25 (discussing the characterization and 
treatment of gains and losses). 
 471. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (West 2017).  With limited exceptions, the business cannot consist of the 
performance of services as an employee.  See § 62(a) (listing twenty-two items deductible from gross 
income in computing adjusted gross income). 
 472. § 62(a)(3), (4). 
 473. I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(A) (West 2017). 
 474. I.R.C. § 63(a), (d) (West 2017).  
 475. I.R.C. § 67(a), (b) (West 2017).  Generally, miscellaneous itemized deductions are only 
allowed to the extent total miscellaneous itemized deductions exceed two percent of the embezzler’s 
adjusted gross income for the tax year.  §67(a). 
 476. I.R.C. § 68(a), (c) (West 2017).  Generally, a taxpayer whose adjusted gross income exceeds a 
threshold amount must reduce the amount of allowable itemized deductions by the lesser of: (1) three 
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of itemizing deductions, a deduction for such theft losses incurred during 
the tax year cannot be claimed.477 
 
E. FRAUDULENT INVESTMENT SCHEMES 
 
From a tax perspective, the distinction between a loss from criminal 
fraud or embezzlement and an unsuccessful investment is critical.  Whether 
an investor can claim a theft loss for an investment in a fraudulent scheme 
are factual determinations that are difficult to make with certainly.478 
If an investment loss is the result of fraud or embezzlement, the 
taxpayer typically has an ordinary loss that is deductible from ordinary 
income479 and may produce a NOL.480  The theft of personal-use property 
produces a loss deduction pursuant to I.R.C. section 165(c)(3), but subject 
to characterization and limitations provided in I.R.C. 165(h).481  However, a 
fraud or embezzlement occurring in a transaction entered into for profit 
produces an ordinary loss deduction pursuant to I.R.C. section 165(c)(2), 
not subject to I.R.C. section 165(h). 
If a loss is not the result of fraud or embezzlement, an investment loss 
is characterized as a capital loss that is deductible only to the extent of 
capital gain with any excess capital loss limited to $3,000 for the tax 
year.482  The taxpayer may carry forward any capital loss remaining to 
succeeding tax years, subject to the same limitations.483  As capital gain is 
less likely than ordinary income to be recurring income, a substantial 
capital loss may never be fully deducted in the investor’s lifetime.484  If a 
transaction is treated as creating a debtor-creditor relationship, a 
nonbusiness bad debt is treated as a short term capital loss.485  If a 
 
percent of the excess of adjusted gross income over the threshold amount; or (2) 80 percent of the 
otherwise allowable itemized deductions.  § 68(a), (b). 
 477. I.R.C. § 63(a), (b). 
 478. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 2.03. 
 479. See supra text accompanying notes 422-25 (discussing the characterization and treatment of 
gains and losses). See supra text accompanying notes 365-67 (detailing the limitations applicable to 
personal casualty loss deductions under I.R.C. Section 165(h)). 
 480. See supra text accompanying notes 379-88 (describing the availability and application of the 
NOL provisions). 
 481. I.R.C. § 165(a), (c) (West 2017). 
 482. See supra text accompanying notes 422-25 (discussing the characterization and treatment of 
gains and losses). 
 483. See supra text accompanying notes 422-25 (discussing the characterization and treatment of 
gains and losses) 
 484. Jeffrey P. Coleman & Jennifer Newsom, Can an Investment Become a Theft for Tax 
Purposes?, 84 FLA. B. J. 27, 27 (2010). 
 485. Rev. Rul. 77–383, 1977–2 C.B. 66, 67; see also Rev. Rul. 69–458, 1969-2 C.B. 33 (holding 
that losses sustained on purchases of undelivered stock from a securities corporation that subsequently 
becomes bankrupt are deductible short term capital losses under I.R.C. section 166(d)); Cf. Morris Plan 
Co. of St. Joseph v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1190 (1940); McKinley v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 59 
(1960) (allowing a theft loss deduction if the “loan” was in fact a fraudulent transaction because no real 
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transaction qualifies as both a deductible loss and a bad debt, the deduction 
is treated as a bad debt deduction under I.R.C. section 166.486 
 
1. Ponzi Schemes 
 
In 2009, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 2009-9487 and Revenue 
Procedure 2009-20488 to provide guidance as to the tax treatment of loss 
incurred in a certain type of fraudulent investment commonly known as a 
“Ponzi” scheme.  Revenue Ruling 2009-9 involves a taxpayer who invested 
funds with an individual who held himself out to the public as an 
investment advisor and security broker.489  Based on positive investment 
reports, the taxpayer invested additional funds and reinvested any reported 
income, receiving a distribution only once during an eight-year period.490  
Ultimately, the purported advisory and brokerage activity was discovered 
to be a fraudulent investment arrangement.491  The reported investment 
activities and resulting income amounts were fictitious and any payments 
to investors were made from amounts that other investors invested in the 
Ponzi scheme.492  The individual’s actions constituted criminal fraud or 
embezzlement under the law of the jurisdiction in which the transactions 
occurred.493 
In Revenue Ruling 2009-9, the Service provides guidance as to the 
proper tax treatment of losses resulting from Ponzi schemes:494 
A loss from criminal fraud or embezzlement is a theft loss 
under I.R.C. section 165 and not a capital loss; 
A theft loss is deductible under I.R.C. section 165(c)(2), 
not I.R.C. section 165(c)(3), as an itemized deduction that 
is not subject to the personal loss limits in I.R.C. section 
165(h), or the limits on itemized deductions in I.R.C. 
sections 67 and 68; 
A theft loss is deductible in the year the loss is discovered, 
provided that the loss is not covered by a claim for 
reimbursement or recovery with respect to which there is a 
reasonable prospect of recovery; 
The amount of a theft loss is generally the amount invested 
in the arrangement, less amounts withdrawn, if any, 
 
debt was created). 
 486. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 187 (1934). 
 487. Rev. Rul. 2009–9, 2009–14 I.R.B. 735. 
 488. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749. 
 489. Rev. Rul. 2009–9, 2009–14 I.R.B. 735. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Id. 
 492. Id. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 2.02. 
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reduced by reimbursements or recoveries, and reduced by 
claims as to which there is a reasonable prospect of 
recovery.  Where an amount is reported to the investor as 
income prior to discovery of the fraudulent arrangement 
and the investor includes that amount in gross income and 
reinvests this amount in the arrangement, the amount of the 
theft loss is increased by the reinvested amount; and 
A theft loss may create or increase a net operating loss 
under I.R.C. section 172.495 
 
Revenue Procedure 2009-20 establishes an optional “safe harbor” 
treatment for taxpayers that experience losses in a “specified fraudulent 
arrangements,” often referred to as Ponzi schemes.496  If certain conditions 
are met, Revenue Procedure 2009-20 provides: (1) a uniform manner for 
determining the taxpayer’s theft losses; (2) a method to avoid potentially 
difficult problems of proof in determining the extent previously reported 
income was fictitious or a return of capital; and (3) alleviation from 
compliance and administrative burdens.497  Generally, the taxpayer may 
elect the safe harbor if the following requirements are satisfied: (1) 
specified fraudulent arrangement; (2) qualified loss; (3) qualified investor; 
and (4) discovery year.498  If the taxpayer elects the safe harbor the 
taxpayer’s losses from the investment are treated as theft losses pursuant to 
Revenue Ruling 2009-9.499 
Specified Fraudulent Arrangement—The “lead figure” perpetrating 
the fraud receives cash or property from investors; claims to earn income 
for the investors; reports to the investors income amounts that are fictitious; 
makes payments, if any, of purported income to some investors from 
amounts other investors invest; and appropriates some or all of the 
investor’s cash or property.500 
Qualified Investor—A qualified investor is a U.S. person who 
qualifies to deduct the theft loss; had no prior knowledge of the fraudulent 
nature of the investment arrangement; and transferred cash or property to a 
 
 495. Rev. Rul. 2009–9, 2009–14 I.R.B. 735, 738.  The holding also provides: (6) a theft loss in a 
transaction entered into for profit does not qualify for the computation of tax provided by I.R.C. Section 
1341; and (7) a theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit does not qualify for the application of 
I.R.C. Sections 1311–1314 to adjust tax liability in years that are otherwise barred by the statute of 
limitations. Rev. Rul. 2009–9, 2009–14 I.R.B. 735, 738. 
 496. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 1.  Revenue Procedure 2009–20 applies to losses 
for which the discovery year is a tax year beginning after December 31, 2007.  Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 
2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 7. 
 497. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 2.04. 
 498. Id. § 4. 
 499. Id. § 2.02. 
 500. Id. § 4.03. 
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specified fraudulent arrangement.501 
Qualified Loss—A qualified loss is a loss resulting from a specified 
fraudulent arrangement causing the loss, if either: (a) the lead figure is 
charged by indictment or information (not withdrawn or dismissed) under 
state law or federal law with the commission of fraud, embezzlement, or 
similar crime; or (b) the lead figure is the subject of a state or federal 
criminal complaint (not withdrawn or dismissed) on similar grounds and 
either (i) the complaint alleged an admission of the crime by the lead 
figure; or (ii) a receiver or trustee was appointed.502  In 2011, Revenue 
Procedure 2009-20 was modified to allow for the death of the lead figure 
that may foreclose criminal theft charges.503 
Discovery Year—A qualified investor’s discovery year is the taxable 
year of the investor in which the indictment, information, or complaint is 
filled.504 
Pursuant to Revenue Procedure 2009-20, the deductible amount is 
calculated as follows: (1) multiply the amount of the qualified investment 
by (a) 95 percent, for a qualified investor that does not pursue any potential 
third-party recovery; or (b) 75 percent, for a qualified investor that is 
pursuing or intends to pursue any potential third-party recovery; minus (2) 
the sum of any actual recovery and any potential insurance recovery.505  
The qualified investor may have income or an additional deduction in a 
subsequent tax year depending on the actual amount of the loss that is 
eventually recovered.506  Excluded from the definition of a qualified 
investment are cash or property that the investor invests in a fund or other 
entity that invested in a specific fraudulent arrangement.507 
A taxpayer who does not elect the safe harbor option is subject to all 
the generally applicable provisions governing the deductibility of losses 
under I.R.C. section 165.508 
For example, a taxpayer seeking a theft loss deduction must establish 
that the loss was from theft and that the theft was discovered in the year the 
taxpayer claims the deduction.  The taxpayer must also establish that no 
claim for reimbursement of any portion of the loss exists with respect to 
which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery in the taxable year in 
which the taxpayer claims the loss.509 
 
 501. Id. § 4.03.  In addition, the specified fraudulent arrangement cannot be a tax shelter.  Id. § 2.03. 
Equity owners in a pass-through entity can elect safe harbor treatment to claim losses allocable to them 
as owners of the pass-through entity.  I.R.S. CCA 201445009 (2014). 
 502. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 4.02. 
 503. Rev. Proc. 2011–58, 2011–50 I.R.B. 849. 
 504. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 4.04. 
 505. Id. § 5.02. 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id. § 4.06(2)(c). 
 508. Id. § 8.01. 
 509. Id. 
MANOLAKAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2017  3:46 PM 
Fall 2016] TAXATION OF THIEVES AND THEIR VICTIMS 85 
 
2. Other Types of Fraudulent Investment Schemes 
 
Not all fraudulent investment schemes are Ponzi-type schemes to 
which certainty and guidance is provided by Revenue Ruling 2009-9 and 
Revenue Procedure 2009-20.  As to other types of fraudulent investment 
schemes, the difficult question remains as to whether an allowable loss is a 
theft loss producing an ordinary deduction or an investment loss producing 
a capital loss. 
With regard to investments in stocks, direct privity between the 
wrongdoer and the investor is required for characterization as a theft loss, 
which is often problematic because investors must establish that the 
wrongdoer intended to deprive them of their funds.510  In Paine v. 
Commissioner,511 the taxpayer was a stockbroker who purchased stocks on 
the open market.512  The decline in value of the stock was the result of the 
corporate officers engaging in fraudulent and illegal acts that artificially 
inflated the value at which the stock was traded.513  The taxpayer was 
denied a theft loss because he failed to prove that, under state law, the 
misrepresentations by the corporate officers were made with the specific 
intent to criminally appropriate funds from the taxpayer.514  The Tax Court 
noted that the taxpayer had not purchased the stock from the persons who 
made the misrepresentations but on the open market.515 
However, if the requirement of privity between the buyer and seller is 
satisfied, a theft loss deduction is allowed.  In Revenue Ruling 1977-18,516 
the Service concluded that a theft loss occurred under circumstances in 
which shareholders voted to merge their corporation into another on the 
basis of fraudulent financial statements.517  Soon after the exchange, the 
acquiring corporation filed for bankruptcy and the shareholders of the 
target experiences substantial losses.518  It was proven that the responsible 
 
 510. Brian Elzweig & Valerie Chambers, Modernizing the Theft Loss Deduction for Victims of 
Securities Frauds and Ponzi Schemes, 30 no. 9 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 3 (2011).  See 
Bellis v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 354, 358 (1973) (denying a theft loss deduction because at the time of 
the stock purchase the sellers did not misrepresent the financial condition of the corporation although it 
subsequently went into bankruptcy).  See Lombard Bros., Inc. v. United States, 893 F.2d 520, 523 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (denying a theft loss deduction because, although the margin calls were conceded to be a 
wrongful taking, intent to deprive the taxpayer of funds was not shown). 
 511. Paine v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 736 (1975). 
 512. Id. at 737. 
 513. Id. at 740 n.4. 
 514. Id. at 742.  The taxpayer also failed to prove his reliance on the corporate officer’s 
misrepresentations and the amount of any theft loss.  Id. 
 515. Id.  See also Rev. Rul. 77–17, 1977–1 C.B. 44 (holding that the taxpayer was not allowed a 
theft loss for stock purchased on the open market). 
 516. Rev. Rul. 77–18, 1977–1 C.B. 46. 
 517. Id. 
 518. Id. 
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officials knowingly made false representations to the shareholders of the 
merged corporation with the intent to induce them to vote for the merger 
and the shareholders of the merged corporation relied upon the false 
financial statements at the time they voted to exchange their stock.519  The 
exchange was theft by false pretenses under state law.520 
The Service also allowed a theft loss, in Revenue Ruling 71-381,521 for 
amounts loaned to a corporation based upon information contained in 
fraudulent financial statements of the corporation provided by the 
corporation’s president.  The president of the corporation was later 
convicted of violating state securities law by issuing false and misleading 
financial documents.522  In this case, the corporate president, “knowingly, 
with intent to defraud, obtained money by means of false representations, 
and was found guilty under New Jersey Statutes of a misdemeanor.”523 
In Viezke v. Commissioner,524 the Tax Court upheld the taxpayer’s 
theft loss for funds invested in what was purported to be an insurance 
company but was in reality a stock swindle.525  The perpetrators were 
criminally indicted on charges of violating state securities law by selling 
unregistered securities through an unregistered agent.526  The Tax Court 
stated that the fact the perpetrators were convicted of a crime other than 
theft does not exclude from consideration the existence of a theft.527  “We 
need not determine the exact nature of the crime under Indiana law. . . .  
The record convinces us that Patterson and Zak parted petitioner from his 
money by deceit and trick amounting to a criminal appropriation with 
felonious intent and that by so doing a theft occurred both within the 




The taxation of thieves and their victims presents many complex and 
unique issues.  Any discussion of the taxation of thieves begins with the 
decision by the Supreme Court that illegal income, along with legal 
income, is includable in income.  Not surprisingly, criminals do not file tax 
returns or report illegal income thereby incurring tax penalties both civil 
and criminal.  For victims of theft, the involuntary loss of money or 
property is, to a limited extent, accommodated by the tax laws.  The 
 
 519. Id. at 47. 
 520. Id. 
 521. Rev. Rul. 71–381, 1971–2 C.B. 126. 
 522. Id. 
 523. Id. at 127. 
 524. Vietzke v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 504 (1961). 
 525. Id. at 510. 
 526. Id. at 509. 
 527. Id. at 510. 
 528. Id. at 511. 
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manner of accommodation and the factual distinctions made are often 
complicated and inequitable.  However, the greatest disservice to victims of 
theft is the priority given the claims of the government for unpaid taxes, 
penalties, and interest over the claims of victims for restitution.  The claims 
of victims of theft, who are often coping with emotional and financial 
distress, should never be subordinate to the claims of the government for 
unpaid taxes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
